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THREE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WAR
Robert L. Tsai*
I.

INTRODUCTION

America is a nation built on war. This is true not only in the
historical fact that armed conflict during the Revolutionary period
secured the independence of a freshly imagined people, and that
American interests in economics, territory, and security have
been regularly advanced through war. It is also reflected, more
generally, in the content of the rule of law, which has increasingly
has been derived from the country’s war experience. Although
talk of war permeates public debate, it is a grave mistake to
presume that all invocations of war are identical. In truth, there is
a multiplicity of ways in which references to armed conflict can
appear in constitutional discourse. Acquiring a more
sophisticated understanding of these occurrences is essential to
appreciating the stakes involved and determining what, if
anything, can be done about it. The practice of taking rhetorical
advantage of war implicates theories of constitutional structure
and political development, while raising persistent rule of law
concerns.
Consider three very different contexts in which the topic of
war has been engaged in recent years: the targeted killing of
suspected terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, President Obama’s efforts
to mark the end of war in Iraq, and President Obama’s decision
to “end” his predecessor’s “war on terror.” Observe, too, three
different ways war can be used in a legal argument. In the first
example, a claim to an actual state of hostilities plays a central role
in legal argumentation. On September 30, 2011, the United States
launched a drone attack at the believed location of al-Awlaki,
* Professor of Law, American University. Thanks to the Morse Center for Law &
Politics, and the Law, Culture & Humanities Initiative at the University of Oregon for
providing a scholarly venue to explore this topic. Feedback during a faculty workshop at
American University also proved immensely helpful. Generous financial support from
Dean Claudio Grossman is gratefully acknowledged. Morgan Lee, a law student at AU,
provided fine editorial assistance.
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who was suspected of masterminding Al Qaeda attacks on the
U.S. The legality of al-Awlaki’s killing depended in large part on
the assertion that an actual state of armed conflict against Al
Qaeda existed. Relying on a classified Office of Legal Counsel
opinion (whose main arguments were later leaked to the media),
the administration argued that congressional authorization of
military force against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks covered
this situation and that al-Awlaki was a lawful target in the armed
conflict. The bulk of the arguments turned on whether there was
a live military conflict against suspected terrorists. Specifically,
the memo addressed whether a presidential ban on assassination
or laws against murder applied to the situation, whether al-Awlaki
and others who might have been present were seized
unreasonably or deprived of their lives without due process of
1
law, and whether the action violated international law.
As far-reaching as the OLC position might have been, the
presidential action nevertheless involved the use of the fact of war
as a general justification. When military engagements are
rampant, as they are today, this appears as a routine persuasive
technique. In the classical form of the argument, a legal actor
relies upon a claim to the existence of a lawful military conflict to
defend a course of action. Whether a lawful, live war exists has
profound legal repercussions. For instance, according to the
Obama administration, if an individual is a suspected “cobelligerent” who might be difficult to capture, the government can
take reasonable means to kill the target. In such event, the
ordinary rule of law expectations need not apply: the marshaling
of evidence, trial in front of an impartial magistrate, an
opportunity to be heard, judgment by one’s own peers.
Although it represents the most familiar type of war talk, the
war-as-justification argument poses a recurring set of rule of law
challenges. Some are definitional: how do we determine if there
is, in fact, a lawful state of armed conflict and when it starts or
ends? How many different kinds of military engagements should
be recognized as constitutionally salient? For instance, lawyers for
the Bush administration drew a consistent line between a
declaration of a “legal state of war,” a power accorded to
1. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/
middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0. In response to the stalled judicial confirmation hearing of David Barron, on May
20, 2014, the administration promised to release the contents of the OLC memo jointly
authored by Barron and Martin Lederman.
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Congress alone, and the President’s inherent authority to use
military force “in defense of the national security of the United
2
States.” For Bush’s legal team, this vast category of national
security engagements allowed the Commander in Chief to pursue
a host of external and internal measures against suspected
terrorists and their supporters, including ordering a military strike
against a nation-state believed to aid terrorism.
Other standard questions involve how to assess permissible
ends and means, i.e., just how far should the fact of military
conflict go to justify coercive actions? What kinds of limiting
principles on war-justified actions are warranted and feasible?
The stakes are enormous, for an entire network of state actions,
policies, institutions, and programs can be built upon an initial
claim to a temporary state of war.
Now consider another notable reference to war, one that
presented a very low possibility for major legal change. As a
candidate, Barack Obama repeatedly called for the end of actual
hostilities in Iraq, which he believed to be “misguided.” Once
elected as President, he gave a speech at Fort Bragg marking the
end of the Iraq conflict and since then he has repeatedly called
attention to its anniversary, but made no discernible effort to
harness popular approval of the “historic moment” in favor of
3
legal transformation. At most, he recommended that any savings
be reinvested in aid for veterans and other domestic programs, or
used to pay for military redeployments to Afghanistan and
elsewhere.
Far from calling for the dismantling of the national security
state or the advancement of new rights based on the gains from
ending the war, Obama remained content to engage in war
rhetoric for partisan gain and ordinary policy change. Unlike
Lincoln or FDR, Obama never argued that the way that the Iraq
war was fought or concluded should alter the way ordinary people
understand the Constitution. In passing up the opportunity to
engage in what I call “war legacy” rhetoric, his efforts presented
little potential for reshaping the legal order. War legacy
2. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo to Daniel J. Bryant, Assis. Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legislative Affairs 1–2, 5, 8 (Oct. 21, 2002).
3. See Helene Cooper, Obama Praises Troops as He Ends the War He Opposed,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/us/atfort-bragg-obama-showers-praise-on-troops-back-from-iraq.html. For the impact of war
on the construction of time to mark the “end,” “beginning,” or ongoing nature of war, see
generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES
(2012) [hereinafter DUDZIAK, WAR TIME]; Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History
of Time, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1669 (2010).
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arguments have their own tenor, structure, and rule of law
concerns, but none of these were raised by Obama’s orations on
Iraq. His election in 2008 heightened expectations of
transcendence in foreign affairs, but his actions on this front since
then offer a reminder that not every mention of war poses orderaltering possibilities.
A third scenario is illustrated by the trope of
counterterrorism-as-warmaking, a metaphor that permeated
many institutions and all levels of constitutional discourse after
9/11. President George W. Bush coined the phrase “global war on
terror,” which key figures in the administration then used to
mobilize support for dramatic alterations to the constitutional
4
landscape. Once in office Obama decided to depart from his
predecessor on public terminology, preferring instead the
narrower formulation, “war on al-Qaeda,” or the clunky phrase
5
“overseas contingency operation.” This rhetorical shift itself is
notable, confirming a belief that this particular form of war talk
has power and consequences, and that certain negative
connotations should be avoided from that point on. Although his
change in constitutional language signaled an intention to quit
actively governing through terror, much of the justificatory
apparatus created by the previous administration remains and
6
new interrogation sites have been established. If anything, the
change in public rhetoric hinted at a desire for presidential
orations on terrorism to do less partisan work even as they
facilitate institutional flexibility for aggressive, often covert,
military operations. Ultimately, Obama’s shift in rhetoric is
7
consistent with a plan to tinker with the national security order —
perhaps even to soften its edges or make it more efficient—but
4. JAYNE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008).
5. Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, WASH.
POST (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html.
6. Not only has President Obama not closed Guantanamo Bay as promised, but the
media reports detention centers operating in Afghanistan and Somalia. See, e.g., Jeremy
Scahill, The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia, THE NATION, July 12, 2011,
http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia#;
Rod
Nordland,
Detainees Are Handed Over to Afghans, but Not Out of Americans’ Reach, N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 2012, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/asia/inafghanistan-as-bagram-detainees-are-transferred-united-states-keeps-its-grip.html?
pagewanted=all. To his credit, Obama’s Office of Legal Counsel has repudiated certain
extreme legal positions on the Eighth Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment
associated with the investigation of suspects and interrogation of detainees.
7. For the contours of the national security order, see generally Jack Balkin, The
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
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augured no design to radically downscale it or attack basic
assumptions.
The nuances are important. In each case, a legal actor
referenced war in making a public law argument, but in each
instance the idea of war did a different kind of persuasive work.
In the first case, advocates insisted that the fact of an ongoing war
licensed a set of coercive programs reasonably adapted to
prosecuting that conflict. In the second instance, a hot war had
ended or was soon to be concluded, but a public figure declined
to use an already mobilized electorate as an engine for legal
transformation. If he had done so, the nation would have faced a
distinctive set of concerns over how to do justice to military
participation and what social meanings should be drawn from the
people’s wartime experience. In the third case, as with the second,
the order-changing potential is immense. By characterizing a
social phenomenon in war-like terms, decisionmakers are not so
much limited by the parameters of any real military conflict as
they are impelled by a general sense of crisis. Insofar as a
pervasive sense of siege can be maintained over time through this
open-ended discourse, the potential for legal transformation
remains.
Why pay close attention to the subtleties in war rhetoric? For
one thing, the background fact of American military engagement
around the world is unlikely to change anytime soon, infusing
war-inspired arguments with a visceral urgency. Americans’
experiences, in turn, have altered the tactical possibilities for
constitutional debate, granting these kinds of arguments historyladen legitimacy and cultural potency. After generations of
military conflict, legal actors have grown adept at taking strategic
advantage of the people’s fears, hopes, and recollections of war.
We can expect war-dependent arguments in one form or another
to persist, as advocates of all stripes turn the American people’s
ideas about armed conflict—either real or imagined—for partisan
gain and structural change.
Perhaps the best reason to be more attentive to war speak is
that serious rule of law concerns are implicated by these various
forms of constitutional discourse. As a family of arguments, warinspired legal assertions raise concerns about transparency,
accountability, duration, and commensurability. For instance,
once a nation’s war experience is plentiful, a party invoking a
particular war may do so less openly, raising concerns about due
notice of an effort to undertake constitutional transformation.
Casual, oblique references to war can take the place of more
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sustained deliberation. Opacity, in turn, may exacerbate
deficiencies in democratic accountability—namely, raising doubts
that a policy determination or legal change predicated in part on
understandings about a nation’s war experience actually captures
a robust popular judgment. War-dependent arguments may also
be open-ended in dangerous ways, risks best illustrated by such
war metaphors as “culture war” or “war on crime.” They blur the
line between a single, legally authorized event and a permanent
course of action. Along the way, they can make psychological and
social linkages between priorities and experiences that are frankly
incomparable, at least in ways that facilitate quality policy
determinations.
If the Constitution is to survive intact against the onslaught
of war talk, it is surely worth gaining a more refined sense of how
and why constitutional actors deploy war in their legal arguments.
Not every invocation of armed conflict carries with it foundational
consequences, but in the modern age, militaristic rhetoric has
emerged as a distinctive language of power. The legal system is
sustained through a national security order that increasingly
depends upon war rhetoric. That discourse, in turn, has been
infused with bursts of hyper-patriotism, memories of just wars,
and fears about illegal or disastrous military conflicts. War
constitutionalism today holds the potential for political and legal
development in surprising contexts through the mobilization of
war sentiments. It is little wonder, then, that public officials are
tempted to turn to this rhetorical tool to gain partisan,
policymaking, or interpretive advantage.
The goal of this Article is to evaluate the practice of war
constitutionalism and achieve greater clarity about the variations
that can arise. I begin by defining war constitutionalism as an
accepted practice in legal discourse. I then assess why it has
become an integral part of public debate. The remainder of the
Article assesses three popular forms of war constitutionalism: war
as a justification, the war legacy argument, and war as a metaphor.
Each form of war-dependent argumentation not only possesses a
distinctive structure as a legal argument, but also poses its own set
of rule of law challenges.
II. WAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: A DEFINITION
Not all public references to war have deep legal implications.
But some do. Let us start with some working definitions. As I
describe the practice, war constitutionalism entails a customary
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method of advancing understandings of a governing text. 8 It is not
recognized as a formal mode of constitutional interpretation by
9
leading commentators, yet it nevertheless has become a
pervasive feature of modern public debate. Certain explicit kinds
of war-dependent arguments (especially justifications for war)
have been discussed from time to time, but rarely have they been
analyzed in the systematic way proposed here. Whatever the
precise doctrinal footholds one might use during constitutional
discourse (e.g., “Commander in Chief” or “freedom of speech” or
“equal protection of the law”), war-based legal forms have an
organization and power that is rarely, if ever, cabined by doctrinal
rules or decisions themselves. Instead, they have been made and
accepted in a variety of doctrinal contexts, whether or not the
clauses interpreted deal directly with warmaking.
War constitutionalism takes place when a legal actor makes
war-dependent arguments to support an interpretation of a
foundational legal text. We can tell it occurs when a participant to
a debate over the meaning of a canonical legal text turns to the
fact, possibility, memory, or legacy of war as a framing device or
an explicit reason for adopting a preferred reading of that text.
The exigency and trauma of military conflict can be a reason or a
trope, consisting of crises and threats, either real or imagined.
Thus defined, the practice is a persuasive strategy with broad
utility. It is a transdoctrinal tool deployed energetically by judges
as well as activists, and by people with divergent ideological
commitments. Excluded from this definition are rhetorical
appeals to war to effectuate changes in ordinary law or policy,
10
without broader legal or structural ramifications.
We should recognize a democratic actor may be engaged in
war constitutionalism when he or she: (a) references a specific war
(a past conflict, an ongoing one, or the prospect of a future war)
to support a legal position, (b) alludes to principles, ideas,
practices, or lessons supposedly generated during particular wars
(e.g., Nazism, Fascism, or anti-totalitarianism), or (c) deploys war
as a metaphor to characterize a contemporary social problem
8. In a constitutional republic, governing texts include any constitution, charter,
covenant, landmark laws, or judicial rulings that might announce or codify a government’s
basic powers and guarantees.
9. Philip Bobbitt, for instance, identifies six accepted forms of constitutional
argument, but nothing resembling war constitutionalism is adequately captured by his
typology. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). I will argue
instead that war-dependent arguments straddle several conventional modalities at once.
10. Again, Obama’s celebration of the end to hostilities in Iraq is, by definition, not
an instance of war constitutionalism.
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(e.g., “war on poverty,” “war on crime,” “war on drugs” or, in
more recent decades, “culture war” and “war on terror”). While
there are crucial differences to be hashed out, these moves share
sufficient family resemblances in terms of structure and function
so as to merit treatment as variations of a single legal practice.
Much of the time, the fact of an ongoing conflict is cited as a
11
general justification for policy. Think of Korematsu’s reliance
upon a declared war to justify the race-based exclusion and
12
internment of Japanese Americans, or the Schenck ruling’s
reference to World War I to justify relaxed review of the
government’s suppression of socialist propaganda. Both decisions
take the classical form of the war justification.
At other times, subtle but crucial differences can be detected.
The legacy of war might be deployed in order to frame an existing
controversy or encourage listeners to contemplate the long-term
legal consequences of a particular war. One can understand FDR
to have initiated just such an ambitious program of war
constitutionalism in 1941 when, building support for American
involvement in Europe, he urged citizens to dedicate themselves
to enhanced liberties and elevate them to universal rights for all.
His “Four Freedoms” program (and the altered legal-political
order necessary to sustain that activist vision) would be the
nation’s ultimate legacy to future generations. Justice Robert
13
Jackson’s 1943 Barnette decision, too, is cut from the same cloth,
as that ruling sought to trade on a legacy of the Second World
War—the principle of anti-totalitarianism—as a reason to
vindicate the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ First Amendment right not to
salute the American flag.
War-dependent arguments can be marshaled for modest
ends and discrete matters. They can also be unleashed on a
grander scale, making up a deliberate, multi-prong program of
ideological and institutional transformation. In more ambitious
incarnations, the practice may be directed at altering the path of
jurisprudential development, dislodging a dominant politicallegal regime, drawing attention to policy priorities, or
empowering certain sectors of the political community in the hope
11. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
12. The Schenck Court stated that free speech rights during wartime differ from
rights in “ordinary times.” See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right”).
13. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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of forging an alternative governing coalition. But what makes the
rhetorical manipulation of war an exercise in constitutionalism are
the actor’s motivations in reshaping fundamental law. Whatever
the substantive areas affected, one’s ultimate ends must be the
establishment of controlling laws, rules, policies, values, habits,
social networks, or dependable institutions for the governance of
14
routine matters.
As we shall see, war constitutionalism has evolved into a legal
practice through instrumental deployment by lawyers and elected
officials as a problem-solving technique across a wide array of
subjects. This has occurred repeatedly over a significant period of
time, with a broad spectrum of actors tacitly accepting the
legitimacy of the approach.
A. WAR DEPENDENT ARGUMENTS IN THE FLAG SALUTE
CASES: “THE JUDGEMENT THAT HISTORY AUTHENTICATES”
A few caveats are in order. War constitutionalism is not the
exclusive province of particular political parties, institutions, or
sectors of society. As a legal practice, it has proven to be pervasive
and resilient despite the fact that formally the President serves as
Commander in Chief and only Congress is empowered to declare
war. Judges as much as politicians have tried to reinterpret the
Constitution in the name of war. So have school officials, artists,
15
and activists.
The fact or prospect of military conflict has often been cited
to expand governmental powers at the expense of rights. Even
so—and contrary to popular lore—the mere mention of war does
not automatically result in repressive behavior by the state. Under
the right circumstances, the practice can facilitate an expansion of
rights. This is precisely what happened with the famous
controversy over the compulsory flag salute in the 1940s. The
Justices of the United States Supreme Court and other legal
actors successfully shaped the meaning of the First Amendment
in terms of military conflict, one that ultimately expanded

14. See generally ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008); STEVEN M. TELES, THE
RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE
LAW (2008).
15. See generally Robert L. Tsai, The Ethics of Melancholy Citizenship, 89 OR. L.
REV. 557 (2010) (analyzing how Langston Hughes’s poetry invoked war strategies,
realities, and aspirations to prod social engagement, particularly in relation to racial
equality and poverty).
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individual liberties. Both sides of the debate engaged in war
constitutionalism, but employed somewhat different arguments.
Two forms of war rhetoric appeared in the original Gobitis
decision that went against the Jehovah’s Witnesses: war
justification and war legacy. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority, emphasized the fact of the global conflict as a reason for
deference to school officials engaged in the “promotion of
16
national cohesion.” The ongoing military struggle rendered the
principle of mutual self-defense not merely salient, but also “an
17
interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values.”
According to the Supreme Court, “National unity is the basis of
national security” and school officials were entitled to play an
active role in fostering a political order founded on patriotism
18
even when rituals must be enacted under duress. Frankfurter
also made a war legacy argument to bolster this second point,
invoking the Civil War: “Situations like the present are phases of
the profoundest problem confronting a democracy—the problem
which Lincoln cast in memorable dilemma: ‘Must a government
of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too
19
weak to maintain its own existence?’”
Justice Frankfurter’s answer favored the perception of
national strength (“cohesive sentiment”) over an appearance of
weakness through division (by “weaken[ing] the effect of the
exercise”). Juxtaposing two historical moments when the nation
found itself at war (the Civil War and World War II), Justice
Frankfurter suggested that the legal stakes should be deemed
comparable. Furthermore, the fact that national unity proved
critical to the successful prosecution of the war during that past
conflict meant that national cohesion should be similarly prized as
an appropriate war-facilitating value now. Thus, school officials
had the constitutional authority to punish the Jehovah’s
Witnesses for not saluting the American flag.
Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion in Barnette, which
overruled Gobitis three years later, struck a very different posture
with regard to the emerging practice of war constitutionalism.
Justice Jackson rejected some variations of the practice, while
energetically making war-dependent arguments of his own.
Jackson scoffed at Frankfurter’s Civil War precedent, writing, “It
16.
17.
18.
19.

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id. at 596.
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may be doubted whether Mr. Lincoln would have thought that the
strength of government to maintain itself would be impressively
vindicated by our confirming power of the State to expel a handful
20
of children from school.” He simultaneously cast doubt on the
suggestion that two wartime presidents would have seen the issues
the same way and denied that a significant national power—actual
warmaking—was at stake in the flag salute controversy.
Instead, Justice Jackson demanded a close fit between the
actual powers used in an earlier war and the powers implicated by
the conflict underway before a wartime precedent should be cited.
He further rejected Frankfurter’s assertion that ongoing
hostilities were sufficient in this instance to alter the legal calculus.
Jackson read the power to wage war to be the exclusive province
of the federal government, something not implicated by the
school board policy. For lack of fit, the Barnette decision rejected
both the Civil War analogy and any argument premised on the
21
ongoing war.
More generally, Justice Jackson warned of the dangers posed
by casual reliance on war-based arguments in judicial decision
making: “Such oversimplification, so handy in political debate,
often lacks the precision necessary to postulates of judicial
22
reasoning.” There are two nested ideas captured by this
criticism: first, an institutional claim as to the uniqueness of
judicial interpretation; and second, an assertion that wardependent assertions can be inappropriate when judges make law.
Beyond logical imprecision, Jackson had a more general objection
to war-dependent arguments: they fostered utilitarian
calculations. “If validly applied to this problem,” he observed,
“the utterance cited [as to the Civil War] would resolve every
issue of power in favor of those in authority and would require us
to override every liberty thought to weaken or delay execution of
23
their policies.” Jackson worried that war-dependent arguments
tilted legal analysis decisively in favor of governmental action and
encouraged a brute utilitarian calculus in which no individual
citizen could prevail. By more carefully restricting the salience

20. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 636.
21. Id. at 642 n.19 (“The Nation may raise armies and compel citizens to give military
service. It follows, of course, that those subject to military discipline are under many duties,
and may not claim many freedoms that we hold inviolable as to those in civilian life”
(citations omitted)).
22. Id. at 636.
23. Id.
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and scope of war-based arguments, his analysis created space for
a jurisprudence of individual rights.
But things are never quite as simple as they seem. Although
Justice Jackson demolished Justice Frankfurter’s previous warinspired arguments in systematic fashion, he never called into
question the form of the arguments. Rather, he then resorted to
war-dependent arguments of his own by staking a claim to the
legacy of the Second World War. He built the case against a
mandatory flag salute in part by describing local officials as
“village tyrants” and reminding the populace of “the fast failing
24
efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.” Along the way,
Justice Jackson turned the repressive behavior of external
enemies (Nazis then, Communists in subsequent cases) into a
negative prototype for measuring the legality of actions by
domestic officials. He molded the historically contingent fact of
war into a set of normative grounds, legal constructs, and other
doctrinal tools for extending the reach of the First Amendment to
protect the unusual beliefs of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Ruling in
favor of these particular dissenters, and reorienting American
institutions toward a generous protection of free speech and
religious liberty, comprised part of the politico-legal strategy of
winning the war at home.
The war-driven exchanges between the two duly constituted
judicial bodies in the early 1940s ultimately resulted in a
broadened right of conscience, dependent in part upon a just war
25
as its general rationale. Jackson called this interpretive
approach—which entailed taking account of how war-inspired
nationalism had fueled racism and authoritarianism—rendering a
26
“judgment that history authenticates.” Barnette approved war
constitutionalism, albeit with a substantive reading of the First
Amendment and the nation’s war experience that differed from
that announced in Gobitis.
What this and so many other similar incidents reveal is that
the mobilization of people, institutions, resources, and ideas in the
24. Id. at 638, 641.
25. Barnette suggests that local school officials’ attempt at war-based
constitutionalism pales in comparison to the perceived prerogative of Congress in actually
trying to wage war. Even so, the decision stops well short of barring state or local officials
from conducting patriotic displays altogether. Such actors can step into the gap when they
are not prohibited from acting by the federal government, but they must still do so in a
way that respects individual rights. As for arguments about war, Barnette rejected only a
popular form of war constitutionalism when local actions interfere with a constitutional
right.
26. Id. at 640.
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name of war has been a popular technique of adding to the
constitutional corpus. In fact, a good many bedrock legal rules and
constitutional grammar can be counted as direct descendants of
27
armed conflict. Many of these war-based articulations of rights
or powers have little or nothing to do with actually conducting a
war. Rather, they take the form of reasons why America fights or
consideration of what, looking backward, we consider to be
legacies of a war that has been well fought.
Once we become sensitized to the phenomenon of warinspired interpretations of the Constitution, it is easier to notice
its abundance. War-strengthened rights include the right of
conscience, mass demonstration, racial equality, the right to serve
in the military, religious freedom, and the right of counsel. Warweakened ideals, during hot wars as well as at key moments of the
Cold War, have included the rights of dissent and association. At
different times and under different legal regimes, one might see
distinct patterns with respect to each of these war-inflected rights.
B. WHY DOES WAR CONSTITUTIONALISM WORK?
Legal arguments that draw on the phenomenon of war enjoy
persuasive power because of America’s unique historical
experiences, the fact that governing institutions have embraced
war-dependent arguments in the past, the cognitive dimensions of
war rhetoric, and even because of the significant gaps in
constitutional text.
Americans’ lived experiences with war represent the largest
component of this body of knowledge. War has been a constant
28
and pervasive part of American life. The seemingly never-

27. As I have argued elsewhere, a great deal of modern First Amendment law
consists of the mobilized rhetoric of the Second World War and subsequent Cold War. See
generally ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT
CULTURE (2008); see also Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in
Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 365 (2008). Mary Dudziak and others
have made similar arguments on behalf of the development of the discourse of equality,
suggesting the conditions under which they might be made, but without making any strong
normative claims as to how such arguments might be assessed. See generally MARY L.
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2002); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS
(1999). Rogers Smith and Philip Klinkner do make an effort to elaborate the basic
conditions of major political change on behalf of rights, but they too are centrally
concerned with elaborating an explanatory model rather than coming up with a framework
for determining when war-inspired changes ought to be treated as binding norms within
the American constitutional tradition. See ROGERS SMITH & PHILIP KLINKNER, THE
UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999).
28. See generally DUDZIAK, WAR TIME, supra note 3.
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ending fact of war has allowed popular understandings of war’s
rationales, ends, and duration to be routinely manipulated for
legal and political ends. Not only has military conflict been a
defining part of our cultural backdrop, particular wars have been
thought to yield legal principles. That is to say, the intensive
mobilization that surrounds war is treated not merely as an
irrational or irrelevant occurrence, but rather, in some cases, as a
legitimate engine of constitutional innovation. The Revolutionary
War, Civil War, World Wars, and Cold War are all believed to be
historical moments when organized violence threatened the basic
legal order, provoked deep reflection on foundational values, and
ultimately yielded enduring principles, either during hostilities or
after the fighting had ended. Some of these legal ideas have been
codified in amendments to the U.S. Constitution (most notably,
the Reconstruction Amendments), while other war-inspired ideas
have become entrenched in statutes (say, the War Powers Act)
and judicial decisions like Barnette.
Part of the answer is found in political theory. Liberalism
demands that state-sponsored violence be justified. Most theories
of the state begin with the need for individual self-defense, which
then ripens into a collective right of self-defense. Libertarian
theories take the theory through mutual compacts for self-defense
29
and stop at the minimal state. Those who prefer a more robust
state go further in elaborating the core powers of the ideal state.
But whatever type of state is ultimately envisioned, it is
commonplace to say that the state’s paramount obligation is to
protect the people. “Security against foreign danger is one of the
primitive objects of civil society,” Madison explained. “It is an
30
avowed and essential object of the American Union.” The
principle of mutual self-defense forms the theoretical foundation
for the classical form of the war justification.
What this also means is that, as a baseline matter, citizens are
ideologically conditioned to respond viscerally to claims that a
crisis risks the survival of the state and themselves. When legal
actors make constitutional arguments justified by the existence of
armed conflict, they trigger the complex political, psychological,
and cultural frameworks that prioritize such external threats as
problems of the first order requiring swift and decisive responses.
Thus, we do well not to underestimate the cognitive dimensions

29.
30.

See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1977).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 256 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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of war talk—its power to shape mindsets, attitudes, concepts, and
even behavior.
War legacy arguments operate somewhat differently than
appeals to a live war: they respond to the people’s rational need
to make sense of a chaotic and destructive event after the fact.
They trade on a polity’s desire for sacrifices to be honored,
civilizations rebuilt, and the rule of law restored. In a republic, it
is believed that victory on the battlefield should be translated into
the terms of virtue, drawing moral lessons from crises to perfect
the legal order and foster good citizenship.
Figurative uses of war appeal to a different need entirely,
namely, that we need prototypes and analogies from which to
make sense of and make snap judgments about our social
experiences. This desire to manage the social world through
comparisons is deeply rooted in human nature, but also incredibly
difficult to control. Once a chain of cultural and psychological
associations have been wrought from Americans’ war
experiences, it is then tempting—in an environment steeped in
war—for legal actors to describe other crises or priorities in
similarly alarmist terms.
Finally, war-dependent arguments help to fill gaps in
constitutional text and practice by satisfying a deep desire for
salience. Intellectually, we may understand the law’s claim on us
even if we never played a part in deliberating over a particular law
or consenting to its terms. But social contract theory and brute
power arguments still strike many of us as providing incomplete
claims to legal legitimacy. This nagging doubt about the
Constitution’s continuing claim of authority on generations of
citizens who did not participate in its framing is exacerbated by
the passage of time and by the obstacles to making formal
amendments to the document. Enter: the body of customs and
precedents that have arisen to help make the 1787 text relevant to
our own time. On this view, the ascendance of war
constitutionalism as a social practice is evidence that formal
approaches to interpreting the Constitution are not enough—
each generation demands its own tangible way of making ancient
obligations salient to their lives and experiences. By interpreting
foundational commitments through their own war experiences,
Americans insist that more recent history matters at least as much
as ancient history.
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C. CAUTIONARY NOTES
Despite the power and even the growing pedigree of wardependent arguments, serious risks remain. The primary
democratic concerns revolve around how to justify war-based
constitutionalism and how to contain the risks of abuse. I begin
with four observations. First, by its very nature, war-dependent
arguments are not tethered to the language or precise history
surrounding the writing or ratification of the Constitution. In this
very important sense, it is a non-textual tool of interpretation that
is inherently open-ended. Instead, the form of argument is limited
only by the actual experiences and memories of the living, along
with any interpretative rules imposed upon their usage. Second,
and cutting in the other direction, appeals to war in the service of
constitutional interpretation usually follow a coherent structure.
Third, such appeals are not constrained by the actual
circumstances of war, as the arguments are made during hot wars,
undeclared wars, military conflicts, and even peacetime. Fourth,
opposition to war-inspired arguments rarely, if ever, challenges
the propriety of using war as a basis for making legal claims, thus
suggesting widespread (if not always overt) acceptance of the
legitimacy of war constitutionalism.
War rhetoric is attractive because, in a pluralistic and
fragmented legal order, it possesses the power to unify and
mobilize. In part because modern liberalism is individualistic and
non-judgmental, it can also be alienating. Both modern liberalism
and libertarianism promote thin, mutual ties of affinity and
respect. The language of war heightens the stakes of a social
conflict, identifies allies and enemies, puts opponents on their
heels, and spurs people to action like few other techniques can.
The argument has what might be called a communitarian quality,
with the power to inspire self-sacrifice for others, respect for
broader principles, and love of country. Through this mode of
argumentation, a constitutional actor can draw upon more recent
historical episodes rather than rely on a revolutionary past that
may no longer inspire belief and action in Americans living in the
twenty-first century. As we have moved farther away from the
colonists’ break from Great Britain and the particulars of their
grievances and lifestyle, it has become harder for that generation’s
experience alone to generate anything like normative authority
among the living. A people’s war experiences—to supplement the
Founding—can serve as a compelling way of revitalizing history
to inculcate constitutional fidelity, i.e., the feelings of attachment,
duty, and respect key to the survival of a written constitution.
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The problem, however, is that a war experience is not
understood in the same way by all who lived through it, much less
by those who learn about a war purely through secondary sources.
Legal arguments that assert the existence of, and depend upon, a
dominant understanding of history may try to impose an
impossible or unrealistic consensus. To a large extent, of course,
this is true of all history-dependent arguments. This difficulty has
never been reason enough to put historical arguments out of
bounds. And yet the possibility should not be dismissed out of
hand that wars—with the unequal suffering, rancor, and
xenophobia that seem always to be unleashed—may prove
uniquely polarizing when injected into constitutional debate. In
other words, there is a danger that, for any particular military
conflict, the anticipated legal stability hoped for is actually
undermined by popular memories of that war. This insight about
anticipated social cohesiveness offers an explanation for why
older wars and victorious wars are more often cited by legal actors
in constitutional discourse. In referencing glorious conflicts, it
may appear easier to project a unity of purpose and to generate
the minimal social approval necessary to maintain legal
appearances.
Finally, war-inspired interpretations of the Constitution can
be entrenched in any number of ways—through statute, judicial
opinion, administrative action, or political rhetoric—that may not
be equivalent in terms of visibility, accountability, or permanence.
The relative degree to which these legal positions can be codified
compounds inherent difficulties in studying war as a vehicle for
legal innovation.
III. WAR AS A JUSTIFICATION
On any number of occasions, the fact that a military conflict
31
is underway or imminent is given as a reason for doing X. When
this occurs, war is being presented as a reason for action or as a
ground for decision. This form of the war-dependent argument is
the most prevalent in constitutional discourse, and, as earlier
32
discussed, for good cause. Because of its general structure (a
premise, a proposal, and appeal to logic), such an argument is
easily identified and therefore can be most readily disputed. The
31. War as a justification for doing X should not be confused with a justification for
war in the first instance. The latter is a rationale for waging war, while the former is a
secondary strategic move, contingent on the fact of armed conflict.
32. See generally supra Part I.B.
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substance of the argument may be explosive and far-reaching, and
citizens themselves may be prone to respond to it viscerally, but
the form of the argument itself poses no special dangers apart
from having to grapple with its particulars. It is susceptible to
contestation according to the rule of reason, in law as in politics.
And given that self-defense and collective welfare represent core
rationales for the state itself, arguments about national security or
emergency cannot be excluded from legal argumentation a priori.
Because this form of the argument at first blush satisfies the
principles of reason and transparency, we rarely see an objection
that a war justification is “out of bounds” so long as a claim to a
live war is plausible. It may be a poor reason or backed by thin
evidence, but these are different kinds of objections. Instead,
having encountered such arguments before, one expects to move
swiftly to a more fine-grained engagement with the particulars of
the position staked out by a proponent of war constitutionalism.
A claim of actual exigency organizes the entire conversation: one
that is order-threatening, pervasive, and unavoidable.
A. JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT: THE CONVENTIONAL
FORM OF THE ARGUMENT
Arguments predicated on a live war as a justification assume
33
a recurring form. Take Hirabayashi v. United States, in which the
Supreme Court upheld a curfew for all individuals of Japanese
ancestry, as well as for resident aliens from Germany and Italy.
This decision laid the logical groundwork for later internment
34
decisions. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone began with this seemingly ironclad proposition:
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
35
founded upon the doctrine of equality.” But he then briskly
pivoted, relying on Congress’s declaration of war against Japan
(as well as the Pearl Harbor attack) to justify a relaxation of that
standard: “We may assume that these considerations would be
controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of
espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion,

33. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
34. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v. United States, 320
U.S. 115 (1943).
35. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
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calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact
36
bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas.”
Importantly, the Court defended its parsimonious reading of
the Equal Protection Clause in terms of the dangers of espionage
and sabotage—concerns heightened by an attack by a foreign
power and the commencement of formal hostilities. Justice Stone
not only described the context as “a time of war,” but also
declared the domestic arena in which the curfew operated as part
37
of the “war setting.” Similarly, Justice Murphy argued that
ongoing warfare allowed the executive to control property and
38
persons in ways that might not be permitted in “normal times.”
The live war argument influenced the determination of not only
whether governmental action was backed by sufficient empirical
evidence, but also whether the curfew itself amounted to a
reasonable response to war. Existing war conditions made the
39
need for “some restrictive measures . . . urgent.”
Now, an opponent to these measures could reject the causal
claim that the affected community has actually interfered with the
government’s warmaking powers. One could also doubt the
40
immediacy of any threat of invasion or the risk of sabotage. But
there can be no denying that the Court’s persuasive strategy as a
whole amounted to the use of a declared war as a general
justification for race-based domestic.
36. Id. (emphasis added). This passage raises two possibilities: one, the wartime
paradigm calls for special or exigent rules; or two, wartime calls for merely deferential
application of ordinary rules. The first option by definition implies a temporary lawlessness
during which time effective judicial review is not operable or feasible; the second option
suggests normal time in which regular but deferential review occurs. The internment cases
are probably best explained by the second reading simply because the Court proceeds to
engage in judicial review, though some of the language suggests the review is so deferential
as to be non-existent. For example, to conclude that “we cannot reject as unfounded the
judgment of the military authorities” suggests the Justices reviewed only for irrationality,
and finding no arbitrary motivation, asked no further questions. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
218 (citing Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99).
37. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101.
38. Id. at 109 (Murphy, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 101.
40. In fact, in an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling, advocates later
tendered evidence showing that the threat of invasion and sabotage was overblown by the
administration, but DOJ lawyers did not apprise the courts of the fruits of their
surveillance. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(granting Korematsu’s coram nobis petition because government “deliberately omitted
relevant information and provided misleading information in papers before the court”);
Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the JapaneseAmerican
Internment
Cases,
THE
JUSTICE
BLOG
(May
20,
2011),
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/1346 (stating that the Solicitor General’s failure to
inform the Supreme Court of the Ringle Report, which found that Japanese Americans
posed a minimal security threat, “might approximate the suppression of evidence”).
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The internment decisions served as a crucial link in a complex
emergency legal regime that delegated lawmaking powers to
military authorities on the West Coast and authorized sweeping
detention measures during wartime. According to the wardependent logic provided by the High Court, “the conditions of
modern warfare” require that “the power to protect must be
41
commensurate with the threatened danger.” Once framed this
way, the resulting debate centered on actual hostilities and
whether the challenged measures implicated the government’s
ability to successfully prosecute war, as it should have.
The responses to an argument predicated upon a military
crisis are legion. An opponent could deny that a conflict is an
authorized war (or contend that its authorization is defective),
argue that the proposed course of action is not essential to the
conduct of war, and so on. Under the right circumstances, one
could argue that the target of regulation is so distant from the
nation’s war aims that the claim of emergency is correspondingly
weakened. In this instance, one could claim that broad-based
domestic restrictions on people not obviously involved in the war
should be viewed more skeptically than, say, decisions to
safeguard specific national security sites or troop deployment
decisions.
Still, to recognize that the form of the argument is legitimate
is not to deny that it has its own rule of law challenges. The
internment cases illustrate a distinctive feature of war justification
arguments: they appear presentist in orientation. That is, they
typically focus on the emergency at hand, preferring not to dwell
on the long-term consequences of a legal action, but instead to
wall off such considerations from scrutiny. Hence, we should take
note of the argument’s tendency to sharply restrict the scope of
relevant conversation.
In Hirabayashi, for example, Justice Stone’s opinion upheld
a wartime curfew for Japanese Americans and Japanese
nationals, along with German and Italian nationals. The Justices
adopted a narrow conception of equality when they stated that
only strong evidence of racial animus would overcome the warenhanced legal standard. The fact of a live war changed how the
Court viewed the government’s motivations in creating a racebased military order, with the Court finding that the petitioner
“was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to

41.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
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him or his race [but was rather] excluded because we are at war
42
with the Japanese Empire.”
The Hirabayashi Court also denied any far-reaching impact
of the ruling simply by refusing to entertain any further thoughts
about such a possibility. “We decide only the issue as we have
43
defined it,” Justice Stone insisted, excluding any considerations
of the consequences of accepting race-based decisions in the name
of making war. Similarly, in Korematsu, Justice Black repeatedly
44
stressed that “time was short” because of “military urgency.” He
deplored “hindsight” analysis and claimed that the decision was
limited to upholding the government’s order excluding Japanese
Americans from the military area “as of the time it was made and
45
when the petitioner violated it.” The Court’s presentist
orientation led to some surreal and hyperformalist moments, such
as when the Justices said they would only review the legality of
the government’s exclusion orders rather than any “future” order
46
establishing the internment camps —but by the time the case had
reached the High Court, all such orders had been carried out.
But treating doctrinally-oriented consequentialist arguments
as irrelevant while throwing open the door to warmaking
consequences may not be principled for two reasons. First, if the
assumption is that a wartime rationale expires the moment war
47
ends, it assumes we can know when war has ended. This might
be relatively easy to do within the traditional paradigm initiated
by open declarations of war and concluded through the signing of
an armistice, but what happens when we encounter war
justifications during military conflicts with no obvious end in
sight? Even where, as in the internment cases, doctrinal
consequences are left for another day to be dealt with, there is no
denying that there may be such an impact at a later date, when the
next emergency arises or the next policy measure is to be reviewed
(the problem illustrated by Justice Jackson’s proverbial loaded
48
gun).
42. Id. at 223.
43. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102.
44. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24.
45. Id. at 219.
46. Id. at 220–22.
47. Note, for instance, that Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued that the passage of
time since Pearl Harbor should be counted against the government, undermining the
government’s claim to require every possible tool at its disposal during wartime. Id. at 226
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
48. As Jackson argued in dissent, a judicial decision sanctioning a poor war
justification could do more harm than the justification itself. “The principle then lies about
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
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Second, one must fight the tendency toward simple
utilitarianism at the expense of other constitutional values, such
as dignity and equality. Justice Black expressed this logic when he
stated that “hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation
49
of hardships.” But wartime burdens are never equivalent, and
there are structural reasons to believe that decisions ostensibly
created in wartime can generate path-dependent political
investments that later become more difficult to defund or transfer
(say, investment in enhanced surveillance and interrogation
procedures following even judicial rulings that cautiously approve
policies). Not every emergency-style order is reviewed by a court
or presents a live controversy once review occurs. By contrast, the
logic of war-enhanced justifications can permeate official policy
and institutions and acquire an irresistible quality.
If there is a criticism to be leveled here, then, it is that slippery
slope arguments are treated as off-limits precisely when they
make the most sense. Crises highlight short-term stakes at the
expense of long-term consequences. War justifications made
during crises marshal enormous amounts of force, rhetorically
reducing objections and objectors to a kind of necessary but
unfortunate collateral damage. To counter the inclination to
mortgage the future by betting everything on immediate, decisive
action, one must find ways of ensuring that long-term
considerations, both principled and pragmatic, play a role in
public deliberation. Even if one does not ultimately stand in the
way of emergency measures taken during a hot war, careful
consideration of foreseeable doctrinal consequences may lead
decision makers to handle war justifications more carefully.
B. AUMF AND 9/11
A more recent example of the war justification approach can
be found in the 2001 congressional authorization for
counterterrorism activities. Citing the attacks of 9/11 as “acts of
treacherous violence,” Congress invoked the nation’s “rights to
self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home
and abroad.” The terrorists’ “grave acts of violence” served as the
basis for a broad grant of authority to the president to “use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons” who “planned, authorized, committed,
claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and
thinking and expands it to new purposes.” Id. at 246.
49. Id. at 219.
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or aided the terrorist attacks,” or “harbored such organizations or
persons” or will “prevent any future acts of international
50
terrorism against the United States.”
Since 2001, the authorization has been cited as the basis for a
widening circle of governmental policies, including the detention
and interrogation of “enemy combatants,” the war in
Afghanistan, the use of military commissions to try suspected
terrorists, the program on targeted killings and drone strikes, and
even domestic surveillance programs. The AUMF has been
invoked not only in public debates, but also during litigation and
51
legal memoranda prepared by administration lawyers.
These developments illustrate that one of the major
difficulties with war justifications is subject matter spillover. That
is to say, once a state of armed conflict has been more or less
established, that fact may be used to justify other exigencies
across a spectrum of social domains. The problem then shifts from
ascertaining the extent and immediacy of a live threat to
determining whether governmental actions taken in the name of
fighting a war is reasonably related to existing war policy. The
further away from the core of that war policy a measure is, and
the more a measure departs from past practices, the more likely
external legal limits (those arising from the Bill of Rights,
international agreements, or other sources of international law)
might be enforced.

50. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1541 note) (2001)[hereinafter AUMF].
51. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 515 (2004) (stating that AUMF
authorized Afghanistan action and detention of person marked as “enemy combatant”);
John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
Remarks at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: The Ethics and Efficacy
of
the
President’s
Counterterrorism
Strategy
(Apr.
30,
2012),
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy
(explaining that drone attacks are legal in part because the AUMF authorizes the president
“to use all necessary and appropriate forces” against those “nations, organizations, and
individuals responsible for 9/11”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL
OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL
LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 1-2 (2011), available at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.;
Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Respts’ Mem. Regarding
the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay,
Dkt. No. 126, Civ. No. 05–889, at 1, 3–8 (Mar. 13, 2009); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal
Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the
President (Jan. 19, 2006) (explaining the President authorized the NSA to intercept
international communication between individuals linked to Al Qaeda). My limited goal
here is to observe the commonality of these reforms rather than to opine on the wisdom
of any of the proposals themselves.
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Concluding that even broad war justifications can be
stretched beyond all reason, some advocates and scholars have
52
called for the repeal, amendment, or replacement of the AUMF.
The major premises underlying such reform proposals are that
war justifications must be codified and reflect, as much as
53
possible, cooperation between the political branches. On this
view, a tenuous statutory authorization worsens the problem of
spillover and exposes a war justification to charges that it is
politically illegitimate, unconstitutional, or in violation of
international law.
RIFFS ON A CLASSIC: GAYS IN THE MILITARY, GAY
MARRIAGE
Now consider a variation on the war justification
formulation, in a more far-reaching incarnation that actually
helped to expand individual rights. On September 20, 2011,
President Obama certified the end of the military’s “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy, which had barred gays and lesbians from
serving their country openly. In his announcement, he cited not
only the country’s longtime commitment to egalitarianism, but
also a growing realization that the anti-gay policy “undermined
our military readiness.” In this way, a war justification once again
contained consequentialist arguments about effective warmaking
relevant to a constitutional question. In this case, fighting a war
more effectively encompassed pursuing the goal of a more
expansive notion of equality for those engaged in the fighting.
Sexual orientation should be stricken from the criteria for
fitness to serve in the military, Obama insisted, with service itself
to be treated as a valuable social good. According to the
president, the nation’s fighting force should not be “deprived of
the talents and skills of patriotic Americans” simply on the basis
54
of their sexual preference, “especially with our nation at war” —
C.

52. See, e.g., Robert Chesney et al., A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation
Terrorist Threats, HOOVER INST. 2 (2013); Robert Golan-Vilella, Time to Narrow the
AUMF, THE NAT’L INTEREST (Sept. 18, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/time-narrow-the-aumf-9082; Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and
the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 449
(2011) (arguing that the war in Iraq exceeded the terms of AUMF).
53. The ideal of inter-branch cooperation over foreign affairs is powerfully stated in
Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
54. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the
President on Certification of Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (July 22, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/22/statement-president-certificationrepeal-dont-ask-dont-tell.
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an obvious allusion to ongoing military engagements. Obama’s
presentation involved a textbook replay of Harry Truman’s
arguments in support of desegregating the military on the basis of
race. At both historical moments, a sitting President advanced
equal protection of the law by arguing that the fact of ongoing
military conflict itself tipped the scales in favor of the anti55
discrimination principle. According to the form of the argument,
the demands of successfully waging war—acquiring resources,
recruiting manpower, inculcating a sense of commitment and trust
among soldiers—aligned with the promotion of racial equality.
Treating sexual minorities the same as heterosexuals made the
military more capable of meeting modern challenges. America’s
fighting forces were stretched thin around the world. Notably,
Obama pointed out that the change in policy ensured that
patriotic Americans “will no longer have to lie about who they are
in order to serve the country they love.” In this way, he drew upon
an abiding traditionalist belief that an effective military required
soldiers who were not only fierce warriors, but also honorable
people. The exclusion of homosexuals from the armed forces
56
distorted the very ideal of the citizen-soldier.
A few months later, President Obama described the
evolution of his thinking that lead to his newfound public support
for gay marriage. In an ABC interview, he said:
I have to tell you that over the course of—several years, as I
talked to friends and family and neighbors. . . . When I think
about—those soldiers or airmen or marines or—sailors who
are out there fighting on my behalf—and yet, feel constrained,
even now that ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is gone, because—
they’re not able to—commit themselves in a marriage.
At a certain point I’ve just concluded that—for me personally,
it is important for me to go ahead and affirm that—I think same
57
sex couples should be able to get married.

55. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-1948).
56. Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) and Patrick Murphy (D-PA), who cosponsored the repeal legislation, echoed these themes: “It is our firm belief that it is time
to repeal this discriminatory policy that not only dishonors those who are willing to give
their lives in service to their country but also prevents capable men and women with vital
skills from serving in the armed forces.” Michael D. Shear & Ed O’Keefe, Obama Backs
‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Compromise That Could Pave Way for Repeal, WASH. POST, May
25, 2010, at A1.
57. Interview by Robin Roberts with President Obama (May 9, 2012), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview-presidentobama/story?id=16316043. For a critique of Obama’s personal tone in discussing gay
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President Obama’s statement proved noteworthy in two
respects. First, he drew on changed legal conditions—namely, the
recent end to sexual orientation discrimination in military service.
He bootstrapped the military service question into the one about
marriage, implying that action on one front ineluctably leads to
progress on the other. If one perceives the two issues as
implicating essential rights and obligations of equal citizenship,
then the idea that sexual equality applies in the military service
suggests that the principle also has a strong claim of application in
other domains of civic life. Second, he relied on ongoing, active
military service—that the nation found itself in wartime—to
justify equality in domestic life. The fact that “soldiers or airmen
or marines or sailors . . . are out there fighting on my behalf” at
that very moment was tendered as a reason to support gay
marriage.
His point was not to convey any personal feelings of guilt but
rather his considered judgments on how war altered the very
conditions for evaluating what equality required. The fact that gay
soldiers were putting themselves in harm’s way, Obama,
suggested, demanded a more searching inquiry by policymakers
into the issues these soldiers hold dear. Third, this attitude drew
upon an ancient linkage between civil equality and a citizen’s duty
to defend the republic. In this neoclassical view (new because the
rights to which citizens are entitled are treated as an open set), the
duty to fight entails a reciprocal obligation of fair treatment on
the part of the state towards the loyal subject of law.
Still, there was one crucial area where the new war
justification argument differed from the conventional form of the
argument: the permanence of one’s legal ends. Note that the fact
of war was not used to create an extraordinary legal outcome for
gay rights, as with the internment cases, but rather to justify a
58
permanent state in civil equality for sexual minorities. In other
words, the fact of armed conflict (ordinarily understood as an
exigent state) can be used to fashion legal principles that, going
forward, will depend on no live war in the future for its legitimacy.
Civil equality for gays and lesbians—in the military and in
marriage, see Elliott Abrams, ‘On My Behalf,’ WEEKLY STANDARD, May 9, 2012,
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/my-behalf_644310.html.
58. Gay soldiers are certainly offered up as virtuous and deserving of autonomy and
dignity, while in the internment cases, enemy aliens and those of Japanese ancestry
(regardless of legal citizenship) are treated as imperfect citizens. So models of ideal
citizenship, whether made explicit or latent in the debate, can and do influence
constitutional debate.
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matrimony—will not expire at the close of the latest war or
international police action. One might find this a happy outcome
because a war going on the time of decision was simply one of
many reasons to support gay equality (and perhaps not even the
most convincing one). It does, however, illustrate the malleability
of war justifications, whose scope can be broadened to include
everything from battle readiness to fairness for those who fight
the nation’s wars. And it is fair, I think, to ask of a proponent of
this argument: just how crucial is war to the debate over a legal
change? Is war being invoked cynically or with good cause?
Some might see little reason to worry. At first blush, the
argument seems to admit of inherent limitations: it is most
forceful when one is talking about the people engaged in
warmaking, activities associated with those efforts, and resources
involved. But we eventually have to face the question that looms
over every allocation of rights and other valuable social goods, at
least from the standpoint of equality: why for some but not for
others? If soldiers are entitled to certain rights because of their
59
sacrificial acts, why not civilians as well? War justification
arguments may no longer be doing the analytical work when such
a claim arises, but there is no denying they might have altered the
conditions in which later arguments are evaluated.
IV. WAR LEGACY: VALUES, PRINCIPLES, EVENTS
At times, certain ideas, principles, frameworks, or events
associated with specific wars may be drawn upon to support a
desired interpretation of the Constitution. Collateral claims about
the normative significance of a war are best understood as war
legacy arguments. Consider President Obama’s September 25,
2012, speech before the United Nations, in which he addressed
the anti-Islamic YouTube video that helped spark anti-American
demonstrations and violence around the world. At the same time
he denounced the slander of the prophet Muhammad, he also
extolled the principle of free speech. Taking a page from FDR’s
60
playbook, President Obama stressed that “Americans have
fought and died around the globe to protect the right of all people
to express their views, even views that we profoundly disagree
59. Or as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972), famously posed: if there is a
right to contraceptives for marrieds, why not for singles as well?
60. FDR was the first modern president to make prominent war legacy arguments to
elevate the importance of First Amendment rights. See generally Tsai, Reconsidering
Gobitis, supra note 27.
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with.” The fact that lives had been sacrificed in the armed defense
of freedom of expression served several goals. First, he
established free speech as essential to the survival of “true
democracy” (rather than some facsimile of self-government).
Second, he suggested that worldwide sacrifice justified the transborder reach of a principle sometimes thought to be an indulgence
among Western countries. Third, his speech tried to foster an
ethic of rights foundationalism—a sense that the state is obligated
to protect some core of individual rights, perhaps because such
rights even preexist the state. Obama then moved from discussing
the armed defense of rights on the battlefield (in the past) toward
the need to remain vigilant (today) to protect “the capacity of
each individual to express their own views and practice their own
faith” wherever that “threat” exists—“for our own people and for
people all across the world.”
Unlike arguments deploying a live war as a general
justification, which contain a presentist structure (whose future
implications should be taken into account only later), war legacy
arguments are simultaneously forward-looking and backwardlooking. The past is interrogated to fashion a coherent vision for
the future, such that a synthesis of T1 and T3 will tell us how to live
our lives in the here and now (T2). As an argument, it is free to be
ambitious while the general formulation must be constrained by
exigency. What is important to the proponent is that the
anticipated conclusion of a war presents the opportunity for
reflection on the meaning of a war and the implementation of
newfound legal commitments.
For the most part, scholars have generally overlooked the
61
prevalence and internal structure of war legacy arguments.
Phillip Bobbitt, for example, has identified only six legitimate
constitutional arguments, and war legacy arguments do not neatly
62
fit into any of them. Those who have observed how the role that
61. For some exceptions to this trend, see supra text accompanying note 27.
62. See BOBBITT, supra note 9. Bobbitt identifies only six types of constitutional
arguments: textual, historical, structural, ethical, doctrinal, and prudential. A war legacy
argument, depending on how it is constructed, might be sandwiched in the historical
category (to the extent it references a particular event), the ethical category (by invoking
a war-inspired principle), or the prudential one (underscoring certain benefits from
offering a war-inspired interpretation). But the better view is that most war legacy claims
straddle the historical-ethical categories. Jack Balkin’s theory of living originalism permits
consideration of “narrative understandings of the trajectory and meaning of national
history,” and one might treat reference to America’s collective war experience to fit this
category. See BALKIN, supra note 5 at 256. Yet Balkin himself does not spend time
analyzing whether war is a legitimate feature of narrative arguments; nor does he wrestle
with the inherent difficulties of war dependent arguments.
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war can play in arguments often miss the ways in which war legacy
arguments resemble or depart from more established
constitutional arguments.
War legacy arguments are a hybrid of historical and ethical
arguments. They resemble historical arguments in that they draw
upon some historical occurrence, but they are not strictly
“originalist” in the sense that they must be confined to a singular
moment of legal creation (say, 1789) or tethered to a particular
act of legal writing. A legal actor might draw on the Revolutionary
War, certainly (in which case the war legacy claim can accompany
more traditional originalist arguments), but she might just as well
draw upon the Civil War, the Great War, or World War II as
armed conflicts yielding important legal principles. When this
happens, a war’s aftermath is presented as a moment of
constitutional creativity. By focusing more on grand substantive
principles, rather than the specific intentions of draftsmen, war
legacy arguments mirror traditional ethical arguments about the
purpose or function of a constitution.
All war legacy arguments rest on the assumptions that wars
can and should operate as engines for the production of normative
principles. Wisely or not, such arguments insist that a sufficient
degree of democratic reflection and shared sacrifice during
wartime can generate something akin to popular consent for legal
change. Some of these assumptions could be factually incorrect
upon empirical testing, of course, but nevertheless all war legacy
claims presume that a desirable degree of deliberation and
consensus is theoretically possible. These legal principles might be
already inscribed elsewhere at a high level of abstraction, as in the
case with Lincoln’s plea on behalf of racial equality (i.e., the
Declaration of Independence states that “all men are created
equal”). But many war legacy claims are not articulated with any
degree of certitude, or even in any single place, leading to inherent
difficulties in evaluating the claim of democratic consent implicit
in a war-dependent argument and the proper scope of a warderived principle.
A. EXAMPLES OF WAR LEGACY ARGUMENTS
1. Lincoln and Racial Equality
One of the most famous instances of war legacy arguments
can be found in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. It
occurred after decisive battlefield developments—Robert E. Lee
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attempted a second invasion of the North but suffered such
extensive losses that he was forced to retreat. Symbolically, after
the bloodiest battle of the Civil War, the North believed the
outcome to be a sign of impending victory. Even before there was
any serious debate over the content of formal amendments to the
Constitution, or even a formal end to hostilities, Lincoln laid the
groundwork for major constitutional change. At the dedication of
a cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, he linked the Founding,
which he called the birth of “a new nation, conceived in Liberty,
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,”
63
with the war sacrifices of the Civil War armies. Lincoln invoked
the glorious dead, “those who here gave their lives so that that
64
nation might live.” Instead of merely recognizing a past event,
he urged listeners—“the living”—to join him in “unfinished
work”: erecting a more permanent memorial to honor those who
65
fought, “a new birth of freedom.” Thus sanctified, the war would
gain the power to remake the legal order.
Looking ahead, the main legacy of the Civil War would have
to be stable government dedicated to equality for all. Issued some
ten months after the Emancipation Proclamation, the Gettysburg
Address can be understood as an effort to pivot from fighting the
war to rebuilding the legal order. Issued pursuant to his
Commander in Chief authority over the field of war, the
Proclamation’s nascent assertions of racial equality needed
sounder footing to survive. Initially, slaves were treated as
“captives of war,” with their war-time freedom resting on
Lincoln’s assertion of exigent powers to fight the seceding states
as insurrectionists. But the Proclamation also made a forwardlooking promise that liberated slaves “shall be forever free of
their servitude and not again held as slaves.” Could such a
promise be kept? Only some lasting codification of war-inspired
principles could fulfill this commitment, especially if orderly
reintegration of the defeated states, too, was a priority. The
Gettysburg Address can thus be considered an exercise in war
constitutionalism, with the entrenchment of new constitutional
principles begun through public oration and popular texts (e.g.,
newspaper coverage and editorials). Indeed, the Chicago Daily
Tribune expressed confidence that the President’s remarks “will

63.
64.
65.

Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
Id.
Id.
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live among the annals of man.” 66 To be sure, speeches can begin,
but not end in new constitutional commitments. Such sentiments
must ultimately be codified in some authoritative legal writing.
Lincoln would not live long enough to finish that work, but his
appeal to building a war legacy initiated the constitutional
process.
2. Truman on the Right to Healthcare
Similarly, consider Truman’s speeches in the fall of 1945,
upon Japan’s sudden surrender. On September 6, 1945, Truman
congratulated Congress for its hard work and then pivoted to
another “great emergency” requiring “the same energy, foresight,
and wisdom as we did in carrying on the way and winning this
67
victory.” The reconstructive program he outlined included not
only the demobilization of the military and the relaxation of
economic controls, but also the advancement of an “Economic
Bill of Rights” first articulated by FDR. That list included “the
right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and
68
enjoy good health.” Throughout, Truman argued that these
rights were the fruits of the American people’s labors during the
war. “In this hour of victory over our enemies abroad,” he urged
listeners “to use all our efforts to build a better life here at home
and a better world for generations to come” by elaborating these
69
rights. Two months later, Truman recast the right to health care
as a universal right. “Our new Economic Bill of Rights should be
mean health security for all,” he insisted, “regardless of residence,
70
station, or race—everywhere in the United States.”
To be sure, like other affirmative rights, much would depend
on the precise services, legal entitlements, and enforcement
mechanisms created. But at the conceptual level and the level of
dialogic mechanics, at least, we have all the hallmarks of war
66. See Editorial, Lincoln at Gettysburg, 150 Years Later, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2013,
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-11-19/opinion/ct-lincoln-gettysburgedit-1119-20131119_1_gettysburg-address-150-years-speech.
67. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21Point Program for the Reconversion Period (Sept. 6, 1945), available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=136&st=&st1=.
68. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States
on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu
/archives/address_text.html.
69. See supra note 67.
70. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Recommending a
Comprehensive Health Program (Nov. 19, 1945), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.
org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=483.
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constitutionalism through presidential leadership: the president
has proposed the establishment of a fundamental right and made
the case for the right in part by arguing that post-war
reconstruction efforts require its legal development. The method
of implementing these constitutional changes remained uncertain:
the right to “health security” at this stage sounded like one that
will have to be fashioned legislatively, but it also could be taken
as an invitation to judicial creativity in sketching such a right. And
by linking the welfare of individuals and their families to the
security of the nation as a whole, Truman claimed that affordable
health care implicates a president’s duty as Commander in Chief.
Truman may only have been setting an agenda at this point, but
by invoking rights-based rhetoric, he laid a foundation for later
presidential interventions on this issue.
3. Judicial Decisions Resorting to War Legacy Arguments
A noteworthy war-inspired decision can be found in
71
Chambers v. Florida, where Hugo Black threw out the
Due Process Clause with an eye toward the European
conflict, he wrote: “Tyrannical governments had immemorially
utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment to make
scapegoats of the weak, or of helpless religious, or confessions of
several black youths interrogated over the course of several
days with little rest and no access to assistance. Reading
racial minorities and those who differed, who would not conform
and who resisted tyranny. . . . Today, as in ages past, we are not
without tragic proof that the exalted power of some governments
to punish manufactured crime dictatorially is the handmaid of
72
tyranny” Importantly, a desire to fight a live war more effectively
was not presented as the reason for acting. Rather, the High Court
developed certain ideas associated with a widening global conflict
against authoritarian governments—individual dignity, antidiscrimination, open and fair process—to help explain why these
convictions must be overturned.
Because the U.S. was not formally fighting the war yet, the
case dramatizes the malleability of the war legacy argument. Mere
anticipated involvement or association with a democratic nation
at war can be enough to make a credible war legacy argument
credible.

71.
72.

309 U.S. 227 (1940).
Id. at 236, 241 (italics added).
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An example of the war legacy argument after American
participation in the war can be found in Kotteakos v. United
73
States. Today, Kotteakos is remembered as a criminal procedure
decision clarifying the “harmless error” standard. In its own time,
it amounted to a work of war constitutionalism. The question
presented in 1946 was whether defendants in a criminal
conspiracy trial suffered substantial prejudice from being
convicted during a single trial. Many differences between the
defendants turned up during trial, and only a common figure tied
the defendants together. Writing for the majority, Justice
Rutledge reversed. Throughout the opinion, he stressed the
virtues of individualized justice over the democratic failures of
“mass trial.” Although participants to a conspiracy to some extent
“invite mass trial by their conduct,” nevertheless “the proceedings
are exceptional to our tradition and call for use of every safeguard
74
to individualize each defendant in his relation to the mass.”
The Supreme Court stopped short of relying on the Sixth
Amendment, but made clear that its reading of relevant criminal
procedure statutes and precedents was intended to do substantive
75
justice and prevent “miscarriage of justice.” Just in case the
casual reader missed the reference to Nazi and Soviet methods,
Justice Rutledge added several sentences explaining why
exposing ordinary criminals to a single unruly trial violated the
lessons of World War II as well as the precepts of the emerging
Cold War order:
Criminal they may be, but it is not the criminality of mass
conspiracy. They do not invite mass trial by their conduct. Nor
does our system tolerate it. That way lies the drift toward
totalitarian institutions. True, this may be convenient for
prosecution. But our Government is not one of mere
convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake, with every citizen,
in his being afforded our historic individual protections,
including those surrounding criminal trials. About them we
dare not become careless or complacent when that fashion has
76
become rampant over the earth.

73. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
74. Id. at 773.
75. Id. at 776; see also id. at 760 (analyzing how criminal procedure is intended to
“preserve review as a check upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness in trials, but at
the same time to make the process perform that function without giving men fairly
convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which any highly rigid and minutely detailed
scheme of errors, especially in relation to procedure, will engender and reflect in a printed
record”).
76. Id. at 773.

THREEARGUMENTSWAR_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

34

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

12/29/2014 3:02 PM

[Vol. 30:1

The Justices gave two principles a new gloss through the
experience of armed conflict: equal dignity and deliberation. The
first principle was underscored by the Justices’ frequent mention
of the “individual and personal,” the “stake” of “every citizen,”
and one’s “identity” separate from the “mass.” The second
principle, related to the first, may be extracted from the Justices’
suggestion that a jury’s ability to deliberate in a way that satisfies
democratic standards may be at odds with “convenience,”
“efficiency,” or “fashion.”
By measuring the government’s conduct against such ideals,
it was said that Americans could distinguish themselves from
peoples who depend on “totalitarian institutions.” The entire
comparison rested on the assumption that the war was being
fought for a democratic legacy, one that judges ought to not
merely acknowledge but also purposefully incorporate into the
law as principles, concepts, and categories. The field of action had
so broadened that a jurist, as much as the elected official, should
be understood to be resisting an anti-democratic “fashion that has
become rampant over the earth.” Kotteakos concluded by issuing
this war-inspired command:
Here, if anywhere, . . . extraordinary precaution is required, not
only that instructions shall not mislead, but that they shall
scrupulously safeguard each defendant individually, as far as
77
possible, from loss of identity in the mass.

For the Kotteakos Court, the principal dangers to be avoided
encompassed not only substantive injustice, but also dignitary
interests that are harder to quantify: a loss of personality brought
78
about by a faceless, nameless treatment by the state. Destruction
of the self through a flawed legal process can be understood in
terms of how the individual feels about herself after being
subjected to such impersonal treatment, but it can also refer to a
general perception among the population at large that the state
77. Id. at 776 (italics added). Justice Douglas’s dissent tackles this charge not by
disagreeing with the characterization of mass trials, but merely arguing that the facts do
not warrant such a finding:
On the record no implication of guilt by reason of a mass trial can be found. The
dangers which petitioners conjure up are abstract ones. Moreover, the true
picture of the case is not thirty-two defendants engaging in eight or more different
conspiracies which were lumped together as one. The jury convicted only four
persons in addition to petitioners. The other defendants and the evidence
concerning them were in effect eliminated from the case.
Id. at 777–78. Thus, we sense that some broader terrain has shifted because the “abstract”
dangers themselves are not considered outlandish.
78. Here, the injury comes about because of a curable procedural defect, whereas in
other situations, such a “loss of personality” may not be so easily remedied.
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has behaved in an unduly coercive fashion. If there was no longer
a hot war in 1946, there remained a continuing war by proxy over
foundational ideas.
Kotteakos illustrates both the strengths and pitfalls of this
approach to interpretation. There is both a past and ongoing
feature to the Justices’ invocation of war legacy arguments, as the
lessons of World War II are uncomfortably merged with more
pressing concerns about constructing an enduring war legacy for
Americans fighting the Cold War. More specific experiences of
battling Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan have
become an imperative to wage ideological war against
“totalitarianism” more broadly. One set of objections sound in the
breadth and ambiguity of this principle: just what is meant by
79
adopting an anti-authoritarian approach to the Constitution? To
be sure, legal principles are often open-ended (see “equal
protection of the law”). The difference, here, though, is that antitotalitarianism as an idea can cut across any number of doctrinal
boundaries, with the potential for dramatically remaking past
legal limits. Are trial rights the only ones that can be appropriately
characterized as implicating America’s war legacy or can other
procedural rules be so described?
In Kotteakos, anti-totalitarianism appears as some set of
procedural values and the dignitary interests that are fostered by
following protocol. Justice Rutledge’s opinion resonates precisely
because of the mass trials and show trials conducted by the Nazis
and Soviets that horrified so many Americans. In other words,
there is a plausible (if not perfect) fit between one historical event
and a pending legal problem. There were, in fact, procedurally
flawed forms of justice being meted out by other countries.
Because the American Constitution is ideologically and culturally
distinctive, our legal practices must reflect this distinctiveness.
Note that the argument is not that America is an authoritarian
regime, but that certain kinds of behavior can be seen as
totalitarian. American courts both honor our war experience and

79. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989)
(proposing an anti-totalitarian approach to abortion). On the other hand, opponents of
abortion have likened the right to abortion to slavery. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring & dissenting in part); Laura
Vozzella, Dems Blast Comparison of Slavery, Abortion, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/va-politics/dems-blast-comparison-of-slaveryabortion/2013/03/19/b4eea6b2-909d-11e2-9abd-e4c5c9dc5e90_story.html. See generally
Jamin B. Raskin, Roe v. Wade and the Dred Scott Decision: Justice Scalia’s Peculiar
Analogy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 61 (1993).
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fulfill the ethical facet of constitutionalism by embracing wellfounded war legacy arguments.
A significant part of modern First Amendment law can be
traced to war constitutionalism. At times, concerns about an
impending or ongoing war led jurists to circumscribe civil
liberties. On other occasions, however, a desire to create a rule of
law legacy for a particular war led judges to favor enhanced
protections for the rights of speech, assembly, or religion. This
occurred most dramatically in a series of lawsuits in the post-war
period. The lessons of World War II quickly merged with the Cold
War imperative. During this formative era, not everyone agreed
that legacy should favor the radical speaker. Robert Jackson and
Felix Frankfurter were among the most passionate proponents of
the view that a commitment to anti-totalitarianism as a
constitutional value occasionally means that certain speakers
should be silenced to protect democracy itself. For instance,
80
Beauharnais v. Illinois upheld a group libel law. Justice
Frankfurter not only rested the decision on the notion that
individual libel was unprotected speech, he also tried to show how
the war effort justified this outcome. He wrote: “Illinois did not
have to look beyond her own borders or await the tragic
experience of the last three decades to conclude that willful
purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups
promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct . . . free, ordered
81
life in a metropolitan, polyglot community,” and cited such
publications as Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political
82
Extremism in European Democracies and Riesman, Democracy
83
and Defamation.
Robert Jackson made a similar, though unsuccessful attempt,
84
to make a legacy-of-war argument in Terminiello v. Chicago
when he urged readers to consider “recent European history.” In
that case, an individual espousing anti-Semitic and anti80. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Beauharnais has never been overruled, though the Supreme
Court has had opportunities to do so. It does stand in tension with more expansive prospeech rulings since 1952.
81. Id. at 258–59 (citation omitted).
82. See Karl Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European
Democracies I, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 725 (1938).
83. See David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 727, 1085, 1282 (1942). That this was understood as an exercise in war
constitutionalism is attested by Justice Douglas, who despite his difference of opinion on
the ultimate question nevertheless acknowledges that “Hitler and his Nazis showed how
evil a conspiracy could be which was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt,
derision, and obloquy.” Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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Communist views before an unruly crowd was arrested for breach
of the peace. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction on
free speech grounds, but Justice Jackson dissented. He pointed
out that “mastery of the streets by either radical or reactionary
85
mob” became “a tragic reality” through Hitler’s demagoguery.
The fact that revolutionary and racist ideology had “devastated
Europe” gave a strong reason for interdicting such speech in
America; those espousing such beliefs in the streets represented
“totalitarian groups” seeking to “undermine the prestige and
86
effectiveness of local democratic governments.” The rest of the
Justices disagreed. Written by William O. Douglas, the majority
opinion opted for the rights-protective version of America’s war
legacy: “The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of
ideas and programs is . . . one of the chief distinctions that sets us
87
apart from totalitarian regimes.” Having difficulty drawing lines
between dangerous anti-democratic propaganda and merely
controversial political speech, the Court chose the maximalist
liberty position.
88
Likewise, in Kunz v. New York, a street preacher prevailed,
but only over a withering dissent by Justice Jackson. Jackson’s
dissent once again offered a vision of the First Amendment
marked by war. The Baptist minister saw his speech permit
revoked based on his repeated public denunciations of various
religious beliefs. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Vinson’s
decision found that municipal permit regulations lacked sufficient
standards. In dissent, Jackson favored restricting religiously
inflammatory speech in part because “Jews, many of whose
families perished in extermination furnaces of Dachau and
Auschwitz,” would surely find immediate offense when they are
89
described as “Christ-killers.” He argued for the incorporation of
Europe’s historical-ethical lesson as part of America’s own.
Jackson’s implication: one of the lessons of the recent global war
was that racist or anti-Semitic expression not only fails to
contribute meaningfully to public debate but also foments illiberal
agendas. At some point, the nation-state is entitled to interdict
such speech in the name of self-preservation. The key, for our
purposes, is that Justice Jackson’s argument in Kunz, as in
85. Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting). At another point in his dissent, Jackson quoted
Goebbels to the effect that Nazism arose by taking advantage of overly naïve democratic
practices. See id. at 35.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 4.
88. 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 299.
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Terminiello, makes sense only when the First Amendment is
authoritatively interpreted through America’s war experience.
Decades later, the Supreme Court upheld the right of public
schoolchildren to express their opposition to the Vietnam War by
90
wearing black armbands. Like Justice Frankfurter’s original
opinion in Gobitis, school officials raised the fact of a raging war
in Vietnam as a reason for silencing the students to foster social
91
unity. But Justice Fortas’s opinion in Tinker rejected the war
justification rationale, instead grounding the pro-speech decision
in America’s war legacy. The mere fact of the ongoing struggle in
Southeast Asia was not enough to curtail freedom of expression,
the High Court concluded, unless the students’ own behavior
posed a “material and substantial” risk of disturbance. Public
schools “may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,” Justice Fortas
wrote, invoking one of the political lessons of World War II and
the resulting Cold War. The frightening image of Nazi and Soviet
mind control through legalized propaganda shaped the Court’s
interpretation of the First Amendment. American school officials
simply could not enjoy “absolute authority” over students, who
should be treated as rights-bearing persons rather than “closedcircuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate.” In that instance, America’s war legacy triumphed
over the exigencies cited in waging the Vietnam conflict.
B. RULE OF LAW CONCERNS
In many ways, war legacy arguments combine the best and
worst of historical and ethical arguments. Substantively, they are
open-ended enough that conservatives and liberals who accept
the idea of a living constitution find the interpretive approach
difficult to resist. Yet the collective indulgence shown such
arguments and the intrinsic pliability of the argument creates
recurring interpretive problems.
Transparency is one concern with war legacy claims.
Compared to arguments in which war figures as a general
justification, these moves can be harder to discern. First, the tactic
assumes social and historical knowledge on the part of other
actors. Without some awareness of certain brute historical facts,
90. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
91. In enacting the no-armband policy, the School Board had cited “[t]he Viet Nam
war and the involvement of the United States therein has been the subject of a major
controversy for some time. When the armband regulation involved herein was
promulgated, debate over the Viet Nam war had become vehement in many localities.” Id.
at 510 n.4.
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this form of war constitutionalism is nonsensical, not to mention
unpersuasive. This risk of unintelligibility (as well as reduced
persuasiveness) increases over time as the generation that fought
a war dies out, replaced by individuals who paid no tangible price
in that conflict (discounted by official and non-official efforts to
control historical memory in this regard). Second, arguing over
the legacy of a war assumes sufficient social agreement when in
fact the lessons of war may be poorly established or polarizing.
92
Third, insofar as a consensus view may exist, an appeal to
consensus about the legacy of a particular war may be casual,
oblique, or incomplete.
Concerns about democratic accountability also lurk. War
legacy claims that traverse institutions in a relatively orderly
fashion and are widely disseminated might have some claim on
popular approval, but more obscure or isolated war legacy claims
could reflect nothing more than ruminations by elites. War legacy
arguments, like any war-dependent modality, can be resisted (as
the Gobitis to Barnette episode shows), but the question remains:
how easily?
Significant challenges can arise in determining the proper
scope of a war-derived legal principle. Some claims to advance the
anti-totalitarian ethic surely won’t be plausible. If, for example,
one claims “totalitarianism” in a way that makes no obvious
reference to an analogous historical event or practice, the
argument runs the risk of severing the historical-ethical link at the
heart of the approach. Overly broad appeals to war legacy
arguments can, I think, be rebuffed on such grounds. So, too, one
can resist a war legacy argument by undermining the historical
component of the argument: e.g., no totalitarian regime actually
did X, the war was not really about Y, and so on.
Choosing which war experience to privilege, and what legal
lessons to draw from the wars that matter, has indubitably shaped
the meaning of the American Constitution. But are such
interpretations truly lasting? Much of the initial power of appeals
to the Second World War, and the Cold War that followed, can
be understood as generational. In fact, sometimes such arguments
collapse into thinly-veiled suggestions that the generation that
fought the good fight has special insight into the mysterious
meanings of the U.S. Constitution.
92. There may be reasons to think that the lessons of some conflicts, such as World
War II, have generated greater consensus, while others, such as Korea or Vietnam, have
yielded a more scattered and divisive lessons.
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Consider John Paul Stevens’s statement in Young v.
American Mini Theaters that “few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war” in order to ensure the availability of
93
pornography or the right to engage in public nudity. Pointing not
to any particular war but rather America’s collective war
experience, he suggests that certain legal controversies—and the
perspectives offered to justify those positions—are trivial
compared to the noble wartimes sacrifices of the many. Justice
Stevens (who served in the Navy during World War II) does not
elaborate what, precisely, a war legacy could be, but instead insists
that, whatever it is, it is not about sexual liberty of this sort. To
wax lyrical about the right to view nudity is to cast shame on the
actual wartime sacrifices of those who gave their all. This kind of
war legacy argument may seem patently unfair, as most every
matter pales in comparison to wartime sacrifice. It may be doubly
troubling to mention the honorable dead as a reason for decision
when no war is even remotely involved in the controversy at hand.
Even so, Justice Stevens seems to be implying that ideas about
sexual liberty are beyond the ambit of any reasonable war legacy
argument. If that is so, he simply fails to offer any reason why
repression of sexual ideas cannot be captured by the ethic of antitotalitarianism. This is why his conclusory statement is
objectionable, and can be read as an officer pulling rank.
Worth noting, too, is that once such a war-dependent
argument is made, however poorly, it can be repeated as
persuasive authority. Justice O’Connor, a quarter century later,
94
adapted Justice Stevens’s war argument in a nude dancing case.
It is hard to know for certain, but perhaps she felt emboldened to
pronounce on the Second World War’s legacy once her senior
colleague and member of the Greatest Generation did so.
V. WAR AS A METAPHOR
When war is deployed as a metaphor in legal discourse, it
does more creative, and sometimes nefarious, constitutive work.
Unlike the war as justification formulation, which subjects itself
to the rule of reason, a war metaphor retains its vitality and utility
by remaining deliberately vague. Unlike the war justification, the
metaphor is unmoored from the foundational principle of selfdefense, as that concept plays no necessary part of the analysis;
when it is unleashed, there is merely a gesture toward the need for
93.
94.

427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality).
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000).
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immediate, collective action. Nor do speakers feel that a war
metaphor must be authorized by a particular deliberative moment
or activity, as with the war legacy argument. Thus, the war
metaphor is entirely unconstrained by legal principle or even the
terms of historical evaluation.
Each time the policy issue-as-war formulation has entered
public debate, few actually believed Americans faced armed
hostilities. The metaphor is thus dependent on war in a very
different sense than the other forms of the argument. Instead of a
live war, the pitch has worked by drawing on the more general
connotations of war. But these connotations nevertheless proved
to be invaluable for winning elections, altering mindsets,
reordering priorities, altering institutional arrangements, and
reshaping the law. To a large extent, legal transformations in the
name of fighting a metaphorical war have occurred in the
domestic sphere. Structurally, the war metaphor depends on
already well-established cultural attitudes and cognitive pathways
that rationalize vigorous governmental activity, high resource and
human costs, and other kinds of collective sacrifice. But the major
shift is that such frames of understanding and legal doctrines, once
created with external threats in mind, are now harnessed for
perceived internal threats to law and order.
In terms of ambition, the metaphor’s order-remaking
potential is on a different scale altogether. The “war on X”
formula assumed most visible form in Lyndon B. Johnson’s “War
on Poverty,” Nixon’s “War on Crime,” Reagan’s “War on Drugs,”
Patrick Buchanan’s “Culture War,” and George W. Bush’s “War
on Terror.” On each occasion, political leaders sought to improve
their party’s standing with the electorate, knit new
intergenerational coalitions and pursue a different combination of
national policies. It is no accident, moreover, that such warinflected arguments were frequently launched as an assertion of
leadership by presidents and aspirants to that office. These
rhetorical performances then impacted the development of
constitutional law.
Legal limits previously deemed essential may be put under
severe duress by a barrage of war metaphors. For instance, under
conditions of ordinary politics there may be excellent reasons for
narrow agendas and separate agency functions, but the pressure
to coordinate may erode rule-of-law safeguards and distinctive
institutional functions. Linguists have observed that a destructive
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metaphor “hides reality in a harmful way.” 95 Used to describe
public policies matters, the war metaphor typically obscures more
of the salient issues than it illuminates. If the war legacy argument
is characterized by the problem of popular consent, then the war
metaphor magnifies that concern through a lack of transparency.
It mobilizes without bothering with a full accounting of costs,
benefits, or moral considerations. Uncertainty over the nature
and scope of a problem can lead not only to mission creep but also
difficulty in evaluating ends and means.
War metaphors also frequently raise a concern about
commensurability. For the argument to work, they imply that
comparisons between large-scale social problems are possible and
appropriate. But to what extent is the problem of poverty or drug
dependence really like the problem of war? Surely much depends
on assumptions left unsaid: whether one believes, for example,
that the causes for such problems lie in man’s nature (selfish or
violent), or a particular ideology (radical Islam, capitalism), or
environmental factors (politics, economic conditions, events).
Further, war metaphors presume that incommensurable
phenomena require roughly the same solutions: massive
harnessing of governmental resources, the expansion of the law,
any and all means that might be adapted to conquering the enemy.
One further problem is worth taking seriously: It is possible
that other types of successful war-dependent arguments “prime”
citizens for this more aggressive and open-ended form of war talk.
If so, normative approaches must take into account the possibility
that war-dependent arguments can be layered in ways that can
become difficult to untangle and expose to the rule of reason.
A. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
1. War on Poverty
On March 16, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave a
State of the Union Address adopting a militaristic attitude toward
a domestic problem: “This administration today, here and now,
96
declares unconditional war on poverty in America.” His explicit
intentions entailed mobilizing “Congress and all Americans” to
support federal intervention in problems that might otherwise be
95. See George Lakoff, Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify
War in the Gulf (Jan. 1, 1991) (paper on file with author).
96. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787.
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treated as state or local concerns. The fight against poverty would
not be limited to legislative achievements in Washington, LBJ
argued, but rather “must be won in the field, in every private
home, in every public office, from the courthouse to the White
97
House.”
President Johnson needed volunteers, job training programs,
loans, programming. He found war-speak attractive to convey a
long-term struggle necessitating flexible tactics: “It will not be a
98
short or easy struggle, no single weapon or strategy will suffice.”
Like a live battle against an external enemy, the forces of poverty
could only be eradicated through tireless efforts, with no
American resting “until that war is won.” Our “chief weapons in
a more pinpointed attack will be better schools, and better health,
and better homes, and better training, and better job
99
opportunities to help more Americans.” A National Service
Corps, expanded food stamp program, minimum wage law, job
training, anti-discrimination laws were appropriate measures—
even tax cuts and foreign aid.
For LBJ, the formulation of “all-out war on human poverty
and unemployment in these United States” had the benefit of
drawing together policy issues typically treated as separate
100
projects. The anti-poverty program was aimed at those who
“live on the outskirts of hope—some because of their poverty, and
101
some because of their color, and all too many because of both.”
Economic blight and strained race relations could be attacked
together, with funding disbursed to an array of programs that
could make headway on both goals. Importantly, the language of
war also knit together disparate constituencies Democrats feared
losing over its embrace of racial egalitarianism. LBJ spoke of
reaching “chronically distressed areas of Appalachia” as well as
“city slums.” Federal policy would help “sharecropper shacks or
in migrant worker camps, on Indian Reservations, among whites
as well as Negroes, among the young as well as the aged, in the
102
boom towns and in the depressed areas.” Even so, the programs
were “not for the poor or underprivileged alone,” but benefited
“all Americans.” LBJ then seamlessly moved to military and
foreign spending, characterizing “food as an instrument of
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

THREEARGUMENTSWAR_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

44

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

12/29/2014 3:02 PM

[Vol. 30:1

peace.” 103 External enemies and international problems must be
addressed to “frustrate those who prey on poverty and chaos.”
Toward the end of his speech, one could detect a flash of
recognition that this global war against poverty would be different
from fighting a live war. The President’s use of the war metaphor
was more about mobilizing people and resources, and effectuating
legal change than vanquishing actual enemies of the state. He
admitted that the causes of poverty are multifarious and not easy
to identify and defeat. “We shall neither act as aggressors nor
tolerate acts of aggression,” LBJ stated. “We intend to bury no
104
one, and we do not intend to be buried.” But the ends of war,
metaphorical or real, were supposedly one and the same: peace
and stability. “We can fight, if we must, as we have fought before,
105
but we pray that we will never have to fight again.”
At one moment in his speech, LBJ made a war legacy
argument in favor of anti-discrimination laws, drawing on
previous foreign conflicts. He noted: “Today, Americans of all
races stand side by side in Berlin and in Viet Nam. They died side
by side in Korea. Surely they can work and eat and travel side by
106
side in their own country.” In that moment, he tied together not
only memories of successful just wars like World War II, but also
more contested military conflicts in Korea and Vietnam against
the spread of Communism. The ease with which LBJ glided from
issue to issue, and from live wars in the past to his proposed
metaphorical war in the present shows the layered quality of
constitutional discourse—how one kind of war argument can
bolster another.
LBJ’s address also underscores how war talk can be utilized
for either progressive or conservative goals. Not only for the
extension of equal protection of the law for average citizens, but
also for a strong military and foreign policy. Thus, the war
metaphor is “stickier” that its counterparts in the sense that it goes
farther than the typical war justification in wrapping together
disparate policies and ideas.
2. War on Crime
Nixon’s strategy entailed governing through criminal policy
by recapitulating liberal war rhetoric for conservative ends.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Having labored to “achieve a lasting peace in the world,” Nixon
argued, the time had come to work toward “peace in our own
land.” Yet Nixon gave the metaphor a harsher tone than LBJ.
Once ordinary citizens viewed crime control as a cousin to armed
conflict, it would become obvious “that the only way to attack
crime in America is the way crime attacks our people—without
107
pity.” Criminal offenders should be viewed as enemies with
which citizens are in a death-struggle, who must be defeated
without remorse.
Nixon’s figurative use of war accomplished primarily political
work rather than adjudicative work. First, in a partisan sense: the
language, which emphasized a threat to security and well-being,
was useful for fostering the impression of unity. It mobilized
citizens already predisposed toward the Republican Party’s
platform—the rank and file—but it also invited others
(Independents, Southern Democrats, anyone tired of urban
crime) to join forces with the ruling party. Nixon reprised
Goldwater’s goal of making “crime in the streets” a national issue
and cast it in FDR’s older Four Freedom’s rhetorical strategy,
108
which had emphasized “freedom from fear.” The Republican
Party would now “reestablish” American leadership on matters
of security at home and abroad—glory that had been lost through
years of mismanagement by the Democratic Party.
Second, in a policy sense: the rhetoric wrapped together
everything from a pro-death penalty position to increased
financial and organizational resources for officers on the street.
For Nixon, Freedom from Fear meant not only better relations
with China, but also an unprecedented assault on criminal
109
elements in America and neighboring countries. “Operation
Intercept,” launched to stem the flow of drugs across the U.S.107. The Law: Nixon’s Hard Line, TIME (Mar. 26, 1973), http://content.time.com/time
/magazine/article/0,9171,906998,00.html. See generally NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST
CIVIL RIGHT: THE RISE OF THE CARCERAL STATE (book manuscript on file with author);
JOHN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Jonathan Simon,
Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1035 (2002). In the Bush
administration’s riff on the war metaphor, John Ashcroft urged in memoranda the need
“to use . . . aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war on terror” and to use “every
available law enforcement tool” to arrest persons who “participate in, or lend support to,
terrorist activities.” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129, 1131 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010).
108. “We shall reestablish freedom from fear in America so that America can take the
lead of reestablishing freedom from fear in the world.” Richard Nixon, Address Accepting
the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach,
Florida (Aug. 8, 1968) available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25968.
109. See James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (May 1972), http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/crime/crimewar.htm.

THREEARGUMENTSWAR_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

46

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

12/29/2014 3:02 PM

[Vol. 30:1

Mexico border, brought about a union of foreign and domestic
domains as well as a coordination of agencies such as Treasury
110
and Justice.
Third, in a reconstructive sense: the war on crime created a
coherent basis for Nixon to mobilize opposition to the Warren
Court and alter the composition of the federal courts. In 1968,
Nixon repeatedly attacked liberal judges for aiding and abetting
criminals through their expansive interpretation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Successfully prosecuting the war on
crime therefore required opening a new battlefront: the judiciary.
Federal law, agencies, programs, and even interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution would have to be reevaluated with these new
commitments in mind.
3. War on Drugs
The war on drugs metaphor that became popular in the late
twentieth century can be understood as a subset of war on crime
rhetoric. Nixon apparently first used the formulation, “war on
drugs,” in 1971, calling drug abuse “public enemy number one in
the United States.” He spoke of attacking the problem “on many
fronts.”
Reagan’s innovation entailed explicitly characterizing the
metaphorical war on drugs as a matter of national security and
embarking upon initiatives with global reach. Speaking at the U.S.
Department of Justice in 1982, President Reagan called on
Americans to “mobilize all our forces to stop the flow of drugs
into this country, to let kids know the truth, to erase the false
glamour that surrounds drugs, and to brand drugs such as
marijuana exactly for what they are—dangerous, and particularly
111
He compared his administration’s
to school-age youth.”
determination to rid the country of drugs to the commitment of
the French army at Verdun. Even neighborhood garden spots had
112
become “a battlefield for competing drugpushers.” His plan

110. In the same vein, the War on Terror produced new networks of authority to
national governance and arguably increased governance through secret executive orders
and legal memoranda. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008).
111. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12368,
Concerning Federal Drug Abuse Policy Functions, June 24, 1982, available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42671.
112. President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy,
Oct. 2, 1982, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43085..
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consisted of attacking “youth-oriented drug culture” 113 by
“running up a battle flag.” In his second term, Reagan reaffirmed
114
his belief that “drug abuse can be conquered,” promising to take
the fight to schools, workplaces, and abroad. At some point,
reducing drug abuse transformed into the “overriding goal of a
115
drug-free America.”
The 1986 mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines and
drug-testing programs comprised additional tools to deter drug
use and trafficking through federal law. Waging war on drugs
necessitated the creation of new bureaucracies for this “concerted
campaign,” such as a national Drug Czar, anti-drug task forces
116
coordinating law enforcement activities, and a public awareness
campaign aimed at children. War rhetoric led to the disbursement
of federal monies for the interdiction of drugs before they reached
America’s shores. Military and national security agencies became
active in drug interdiction activities, including the arrest of drug
lords. The U.S. Attorneys offices in every state became the
aggressive enforcers of federal drug policies.
4. Culture War
One of the more potent ways of encapsulating the
constitutional stakes raised by social issues is to raise the specter
of a fearsome “culture war.” The kulturkampf idea, taken from
the German experience, had occasionally been used in early
117
twentieth century America to discuss rising class conflict. Since
the 1980s and 90s, however, the construct has been systematically
deployed by social conservatives and prominent Republican
figures, to describe a great religious and social battle in the public
sphere and to issue a call to arms to defend traditional values.

113. President Ronald Reagan, Proclamation 5236-National Drug Abuse Education
and Prevention Week, Sept. 21, 1984, available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1984/92184d.htm..
114. President Ronald Reagan, Message to the Congress Transmitting a Report on a
National Strategy for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking, Sept. 27, 1984,
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40445..
115. President Ronald Reagan, Memorandum Urging Support of Federal Initiatives
for a Drug-Free America, Oct. 4, 1986, available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1986/100486b.htm.
116. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks Announcing Federal Initiatives Against
Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, Oct. 14, 1982, available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43127.
117. In Canada, the term has lately been used to describe values-based conflict along
regional lines.
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For instance, in 1992, Patrick Buchanan’s speech at the
Republican National Convention described “a religious war going
118
on in our country for the soul of America.” He called it “a
cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as
was the Cold War itself.” Buchanan’s move—to pile one extended
metaphor on top of another—illustrates some of the dangers
already identified. One set of issues (relations with the Soviet
Union and the world) had been acceptably defined as a multigenerational militarized struggle, and now Buchanan hoped to
draw upon the legitimacy and perceived success of that conflict to
mobilize an internal fight over public morality. If elected
president, Buchanan promised to use “the full extent of my power
and ability” to “defend American traditions and the values of
119
faith, family, and country.”
In its contemporary incarnation, the culture-as-war
metaphor captures a broad range of dissenting views on
constitutional development. Among the issues Buchanan
highlighted were abortion, gay rights, “discrimination against
religious schools,” “purveyors of sex and violence” (presumably
through expansive free speech protections), and women in
120
combat. Others have extended these complaints to cover any
policy or law that affects the family, the public role of women and
sexual minorities, religious freedom and expressive liberty.
Operationally, the contrast invites the people to take sides: to
either be with authentic values and those who might wish to
destroy all that is good about American law and culture. Thus, the
aligning function of a potent constitutional metaphor (whose side
are you on?) and its redirecting function (of influence over social
issues away from courts toward the church or elected assemblies)
are most prominent.
Once adopted by lawyers and jurists, the metaphor can take
on additional regime-altering tones. The most prominent user of
the litigation-as-war model has been Justice Scalia, who has
121
consistently deployed the tool when discussing gay rights issues.

118. Patrick J. Buchanan, Speech to the Republican National Convention, Aug. 17,
1992, available at http://buchanan.org/blog/1992-republican-national-convention-speech148.
119. Patrick J. Buchanan, Announcement Speech, Mar. 20, 1995, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/candidates/republican/withdrawn/buch.anno
uncement.shtml.
120. Buchanan, RNC Speech, supra note 118.
121. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The metaphor’s popularity is further
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By characterizing the equal protection claims of gay Americans as
implicating a “culture war,” he implies several things: gay citizens
started the fight by assaulting majoritarian values; gay rights by
their nature raise different kinds of jurisprudential problems;
judicial review will inflame rather than reduce or redirect cultural
conflict; and such matters are better left for the political branches
because decisions inevitably entail “tak[ing] sides in the culture
122
war.”
But there is potentially something more dramatic in Justice
Scalia’s use of the term. He also appears to be launching a subtle,
though popular, assault on the Carolene Products framework,
which has long been utilized to authorize intermittent judicial
involvement in politics to protect “discrete and insular
123
minorities.” In his deployment of the war metaphor, Justice
Scalia is not only suggesting that sexual minorities are not such
minorities worthy of protection, but may even be undermining the
framework itself. If the metaphorical approach were to be taken
seriously in the legal domain, it would reorganize the courts’
relationship to other institutions, rights claimants, and the
Constitution in important ways. First, legal questions implicating
strong cultural or religious values might be placed beyond the
reach of courts. Taking Scalia’s conflict avoidance rhetoric
seriously might lead to the creation of a tiered or rule—and—
exception standard to the treatment of individual rights. Second,
doing so would introduce a potentially unprincipled threshold
question into nearly every adjudicatory proceeding implicating
the Bill of Rights. Third, it would effectively alter the relationship
between federal courts that could review such matters and the
many states in which “cultural” issues would arise. States that are
especially active on such social questions might, under Scalia’s
approach, be entitled to greater leeway to make value-laden
judgments.
It is hard to know for certain how to operationalize Scalia’s
insights, and that vagueness underscores a major defect of the
litigation-as-war metaphor. The construct plays on popular
evidence of intent to do primarily political work: rousing social conservatives, ridiculing
legal liberals, encouraging other jurists to stay their hand.
122. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. To be sure, some critics of Carolene Products have found the approach outdated
and suggested alternatives that would be sufficiently protective of minority rights. See, e.g.,
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002). Justice Scalia’s culture war metaphor,
however, contends that equal protection jurisprudence is overly protective of minority
rights and is accompanied by no alternative framework.
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concerns about judicial overreaching, and some citizens’ moral
and policy preferences against gay rights, but he never tells us
what it would mean for judges to start carving out subject matter
issues from judicial review. Justice Scalia could disclaim any of the
doctrinal consequences that might come with taking the
comparison between cultural debate and warmaking seriously. In
the meantime, he has gained attention for anti-gay forces and
institutional conservatives alike, rallying elites and ordinary
people through strategic ambiguity. Though highly quotable, the
war metaphor in judicial rulings appears to accomplish more
political work than jurisprudential.
5. War on Terror
President George Bush’s metaphorical war on terror had its
genesis in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks by Islamic Jihadists. On
September 20, 2001, President Bush gave a speech to a Joint
Session of Congress in which he declared, for the first time, “war
124
on terror.” Although they did not appear to be state-sponsored,
President Bush characterized the terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda as
an “act of war against our country” by the “enemies of
125
freedom.” Though counterterrorist efforts do not involve
conventional enemies or tactics, war-talk primed the public for an
open-ended conflict licensing aggressive, overwhelming, and
creative technologies: “We will direct every resource at our
command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence,
every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence,
and every necessary weapon of war, to the disruption and to the
126
defeat of the global terror network.”
President Bush warned that it would be hard to identify clean
victories or even an end to the need for war. Unlike the first war
against Iraq, there will be no “decisive liberation of territory and
a swift conclusion.” Rather, it will involve a “lengthy
127
campaign.” Note that war rhetoric had now been adapted for
open-ended conflict: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida,
124. President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,
Sept.
20,
2001,
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_
Bush.pdf.
125. Id.
126. Id. For accounts of the events and major players in this legal transformation, see
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2009); MAYER, supra note 109.
127. President Bush, Address to Congress, supra note 124.
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but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group
128
of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” The war
on terror is to protect “our way of life,” perhaps even civilization
itself.
Once again, the war-on-terror formulation divided the world
into two camps: allies and enemies. “Every nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make,” as President Bush declared.
129
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”
Constituents and other legal actors heard a similar message:
public policies and legal rules must help our allies and hurt our
enemies. Legal uncertainty or modesty could only embolden
terrorists. The invocation of inflexible communal boundaries
points the way to simplistic answers, almost always intended to
rationalize the use of force. Critically, presidential orations
advancing this view of terrorism altered the political environment
in which official legal arguments are made and evaluated by
others.
As vague and troublesome as the rhetorical technique can be
in political domains, the perils are of a different order of
130
magnitude in the realm of constitutional interpretation. War as
a metaphor has the potential for destroying legal limits, or at least
blurring lines sufficiently to render institutional checks
inoperable. The problem of rhetorical layering described
earlier—of different kinds of war-dependent arguments
sustaining
one
another—is
dramatized
by
ongoing
counterterrorism efforts. Even as political actors advanced the
terror-as-war metaphor in public discourse, legal actors pushed
other war-inspired arguments in legal memoranda and briefs. War
metaphors piled on top of war justifications made it difficult to
evaluate these arguments.
For instance, attorneys at the Office of Legal Counsel argued
in June 2002 that America found itself in “a state of armed
131
conflict.” Then-Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee argued,
that war began with the attacks of September 11, which justified
America’s armed response to “subdue the al Qaeda terrorist
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Louis Henkin observes an added problem: war and terrorism separately are
troublesome concepts not clearly defined in international law. See Louis Henkin, War and
Terrorism: Law or Metaphor, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 817, 820-22 (2005). Neither is
mentioned in the U.N. Charter. Thus, mixing such popular, fluid notions in constitutional
discourse can create more problems than they solve.
131. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to the Att’y Gen., Determination of Enemy
Belligerency and Military Detention, June 8, 2002, at 2–3.
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network and the Taliban regime” in the broadest possible sense.
Congressional support itself did not “distinguish between
deployment of the military either at home or abroad,” but the
president’s inherent power is not limited in such a fashion either.
Just as important, executive branch lawyers did not believe the
war to be conventional in nature or scope. Instead of fighting a
“traditional nation-state,” America “is at war with an
international terrorist organization, whose members have entered
the nation covertly and have infiltrated our society in sleeper
132
cells.” The state’s ability to confront its enemies must adapt to
this new threat. Accordingly, the government had lawful authority
to detain Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen believed to be associated with
Al Qaeda, as an unlawful enemy combatant subject only to the
laws of war.
The thrust of Bybee’s letter may have focused on the
detention of parties linked to organizations responsible for the
9/11 attacks, but other legal memoranda extended the war
rationale to other contexts. OLC advanced the terrorism-as-war
argument to claim that the president had inherent authority to
convene military tribunals to try detainees, who would not enjoy
133
For the Bush
constitutional protections in that setting.
administration, the war on terror was, for all legal purposes,
equivalent to the prosecution of past wars in determining the
scope of presidential power. For precedent, lawyers cited
President Washington’s appointment of a Board of General
Officers to try a suspected spy, President Jackson’s creation of
military tribunals to try English suspects accused of inciting Creek
Indians to war with the United States, and in-the-field decisions
by military officers to administer justice during the Mexican
134
American War and the Civil War. Once the analogy was
accepted, lawyers argued, actions taken in the name of the war on
terror are subject only to the rules governing the laws of war
rather than constitutional protections articulated in the Bill of
Rights.

132. Id. at 6.
133. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzalez from Patrick F. Philbin, Legality of
the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists, Nov. 6, 2001 [hereinafter Philbin,
Legality of the Use of Military Commissions].
134. Id. at 8. The Civil War has played a prominent role in justifying sweeping
presidential authority to deter and repel attacks on domestic soil. See Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzalez & William J. Haynes from John C. Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty,
Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States,
Oct. 23, 2001, at 10.

THREEARGUMENTSWAR_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THREE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WAR

12/29/2014 3:02 PM

53

But how should one determine in the first place whether a
state of war exists? The administration’s approach blurred various
terms of art, including “war,” “state of war,” “armed attack,” and
“terrorism.” Whatever the case may be, OLC lawyers argued that,
despite the Constitution’s vesting of the power to declare war in
Congress, the president as Commander in Chief possesses “full
authority to determine when the nation has been thrust into a
conflict that must be recognized as a state of war and treated
135
under the laws of war.” That determination, moreover, is a
political decision that cannot be countermanded by the courts.
OLC lawyers proceeded to state the case for Al Qaeda’s
136
attacks to be treated as “more akin to war than terrorism.”
Focusing on the destructiveness of the 9/11 attacks, legal memos
claimed that the death toll (some 3,000 lives lost) “surpasses that
at Pearl Harbor, and rivals the toll at the battle of Antietam in
1862, one of the bloodiest engagements in the Civil War.” In an
important and far-reaching move, lawyers also encouraged
readers to treat past acts of terrorism, regardless of the instigators,
“as part of that continuing series of attacks” and as “a systematic
137
campaign of hostilities.”
Separately, lawyers defended the accuracy of the metaphor
because in calling for jihad against the United States, bin Laden
138
had started a “self-proclaimed war.” On this view, a state of war
exists in part when an attacking party calls it a war. The problem
is that reliance on others is fraught with problems of inter-system
translation, namely, whether a legal actor’s words and actions in
one legal order mean the same thing when he uses similar
terminology in another legal system. A further complication is
that according to bin Laden’s call for jihad against Jews and
Western invaders, he arguably makes the same claim: that others
initiated armed conflict against Muslims so they, in turn, are
139
justified in repelling violence with violence.
OLC memoranda underscore my concern about crossdomain bolstering. Lawyers argued that the fight against terror
should be treated as a war in part because the president himself
had already “described the current situation as a ‘war’” and taken
135. Philbin, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions, supra note 133, at 22.
136. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 134, at 2.
137. Philbin, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions, supra note 133, at 28.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad,
77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 1998, available at http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/
54594/bernard-lewis/license-to-kill-usama-bin-ladins-declaration-of-jihad.
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actions consistent with that understanding. 140 Political rhetoric
now was being harnessed to shape legal interpretation. Lawyers
did so in two ways: first, by formally demanding that courts defer
to a presidential description of hostilities as a war, and second, by
inviting the courts to adopt and replicate the president’s war
characterization. The overall strategy entailed seeking what I
have previously called “rhetorical congruence”: an appearance of
141
political-legal consensus among the branches of government. To
put it simply, the approach involves political actors aggressively
declaring a constitutional vision and inviting others (for the sake
of institutional cooperation or social unity) to tow the party line.
To the extent that courts speak about a social phenomenon in
ways preferred by political actors, the field in which constitutional
decisions are rendered has already shifted. Constitutional
struggles entail fights over not simply outcomes but also public
terminology, background facts, and institutional habits. Victories
in how other actors or ordinary citizens view a situation can
increase the odds of legal success as well as how setbacks are
perceived.
At the same time that lawyers wished to enjoy all of the
consequences of describing counterterrorism as warmaking, they
did not want to be saddled by all its limitations. They did not want
to be overly constrained by the war metaphor because of the law
of war’s dominant metaphor: war as a game, one generally fought
by national armies under rules of fair competition. If fighting
terror was akin to making war, then the Bush administration
nevertheless insisted on even greater flexibility in fighting a new
kind of “war.” First, unlike many past wars, “this conflict may take
place, in part, on the soil of the United States.” It no longer made
sense to talk of the “war front” separately from the “home front”
or of restricting the government’s power along such dimensions.
Second, U.S. fought clandestine organizations and individuals
rather than traditional nation-states. Legal rules created to
protect “non-combatant civilian populations” would have to be
reconsidered.
In short, the “scale of the violence involved in this conflict”
as well as the ill-fitting quality of the war metaphor required
altering well-settled treaties, laws, and constitutional rights.
140. Philbin, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions, supra note 133, at 29. In
particular, lawyers pointed out the president’s decision to mobilize the armed forces and
reserves.
141. See generally TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON, supra note 27; Tsai,
Reconsidering Gobitis, supra note 27, at 382–83.
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Through a series of legal memos and policy directives, the Bush
administration pursued an expansive theory of presidential power
and effectuated a major transformation in how the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are
understood.
Inherent problems with the terror-as-war formulation linger.
The rhetorical needs for adjudication are not identical to those for
political mobilization. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in Hamdi,
though national security is no doubt implicated by U.S. efforts
against terrorism, the “war on terror” formulation makes claims
142
of national security “broad and malleable.” This suggests that
judicial decisionmakers find war metaphors difficult to assess and
worse, perhaps renders programs unsusceptible to rational
review. The metaphorical strategy invites endorsement of highly
coercive policies to meet a grave threat. And, over time, it lowers
institutional resistance to “indefinite or perpetual” programs by
reference to vague, though ongoing threats of unknown origin or
duration.
The chain of connotations that might initially be resisted as
awkward or absurd can eventually become naturalized through
repeated usage. Hamdi, decided in 2007, put quotation marks
around “War on Terror” to mark the phrase as the
administration’s own. In more recent years, jurists have taken to
143
describing the War on Terror as a historical fact. Although the
sample is small, the pattern seems somewhat more pronounced in
the D.C. Circuit. There are a few possible explanations. It might
be that judges are more institutionally or ideologically
conservative on certain courts, or it could be that, having
encountered repeated legal controversies involving terrorism
(along with the administration’s aggressive framing of the stakes),
judges have internalized the politically preferred terminology.
Having done so, they then set about reproducing the vision
preferred by public officials. In these moments, jurists accomplish
more political work than jurisprudential. Once completed, that
work, in the law as in politics, may no longer need the original
linguistic infrastructure to sustain it.

142. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004).
143. See, e.g., Abdah v. Obama, 630 F.3d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2011); ACLU v. U.S.
Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866,
873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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B. RULE OF LAW CONCERNS
Metaphors can be powerful tools by which to organize
ideologies, knit together disparate legal and policy positions, and
put opponents on the defensive. There are any number of
ordinary metaphors that have been proven useful for elucidating
144
legal ideas. Even so, war metaphors in public debate may be
particularly insidious. First, they can inject fears over first-order
survival into questions that might, properly evaluated, raise no
such foundational concerns. Second, war metaphors may facilitate
extreme measures when complexity or modesty in legal design are
more appropriate. Third, they invite overly abstract debate in a
context where transparency and accountability are at a premium.
Fourth, the expansive quality of war metaphors can facilitate
145
mission creep.
In theory, it may be possible to undermine a prevalent
metaphor by subverting it. More often, what happens is that a
potent metaphor gets recycled so that competing constructs
146
become available in an existing body of knowledge. Historical
practice seems to bear this out. The more entrenched patterns in
law and politics suggest that it has been far easier for opponents
of one type of war metaphor to simply repurpose it for a different
agenda rather than to undermine the metaphor’s basic structure.
Progressives had their favorite war metaphor; over time,
conservatives built their own versions of the war metaphor.
During this process, each side has merely reinforced the basic
cultural and cognitive features of that metaphor, enhancing its
transformative potential rather than destroying it.
Opponents of a war metaphor may be best advised to engage
in the politics of the literal. Showing all the ways in which a social
problem differs from military conquest is a start. It may also be
productive to demonstrate how the policy problem-as-war
metaphor implicitly excludes such considerations as morality or
144. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (2003);
TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON, supra note 27; STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE
FOREST: LAW, LIFE, MIND (2003); Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of
Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779 (2002); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 987 (2012);
Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181 (2004).
145. Cf. Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We
Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (contending that
the war on drugs did not originally target teenagers but did so over time).
146. For instance, property and fire metaphors in First Amendment law, originally
yielding anti-speech outcomes, have been repurposed over time to facilitate more
expansive protections for expressive liberty. See generally TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND
REASON, supra note 27, at 49–77.
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feasibility. Still another tactic would be to highlight the serious,
understated costs of treating a domestic social problem like a
problem of national self-defense. These approaches reject the
propriety of the implicit analogy being drawn without denying the
necessity of preparation for an actual war. The overly simplistic,
seemingly natural linkages between fighting a war and tackling a
social problem may simply fall away.
This is not to say that symbolism should be altogether
avoided. After all, constitutional discourse is in part an exercise in
popular lawmaking. If there are sounder metaphorical models to
be presented, ones that better encapsulate a social issue without
the attendant problems of characterizing it in warlike terms, then
all the better. President Obama has used the punishment
147
metaphor in describing his policy on Syria. While this law-andorder construct has its problems, the metaphor nevertheless poses
fewer risks from the standpoint of constitutional transformation.
The key is to find ways of talking about social problems that
are effective while drawing away excessive heat and urgency. For
reasons of efficiency and short-term solidarity, it is tempting to
move to language that mobilizes people and institutions quickly.
But strident discourse is also likely to generate (if not right away,
then down the road), a significant amount of pushback. The
strength of a popular reaction will determine whether a rapid
transformation becomes a lasting one. Calling counterterrorism
efforts part of a global “war on terror” allowed an ad hoc working
group in the Bush administration to alter long-standing legal
commitments in a host of areas, foreign and domestic. But doing
so also disrupted diplomatic relations, led to key OLC legal
memos to be repudiated and withdrawn, and paved the way for
the election of a Democratic president who campaigned against
such changes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Does it matter how we talk about war? This paper has
proceeded on the premise that words matter a great deal when we
inject war-dependent arguments into debates over the
Constitution. Although war constitutionalism is an old practice,
how we choose to talk about war affects not only how power and
rights are understood, but also what we choose to remember to be
147. See George Lakoff, Obama Reframes Syria: Metaphor and War Revisited,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-lakoff/obamareframes-syria-meta_b_3879335.html.
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important about our war experiences. War rhetoric possesses a
transformative capacity, and that potential must always be
carefully justified, scrutinized, and disciplined.
As we have seen, war constitutionalism can help to
fundamentally alter the environment in which claims over powers
and rights are decided. The layering of different war-dependent
arguments, the conditioning of the citizenry to tolerate claims
about war, and the constant manipulation of political memories
foster a war-laden legal culture. Once a lynchpin decision is
made—whether its resembles Barnette or Hirabayashi—future
decisions can be built upon its infrastructure without being as
visible or explanatory. The war weary can become more amenable
to such arguments, without the level of engagement one would
want in a democratic society. In such an environment, it becomes
imperative to be watchful for both visible changes to the law and
mindful of the foreseeable use of legal arguments.
I began this essay by observing that President Obama had,
upon taking office, changed the way he publicly discussed
America’s counterterrorism program. No longer would he use the
counterterrorism-as-war metaphor, though he freely engaged
other forms of war-dependent arguments for a host of domestic
and foreign policy purposes. But changing the overarching
rhetoric may be less important once new institutions and
rationales have been established. By several measures—the
ferocity and frequency of drone strikes, the continuation of
renditions, the dogged pursuit of terrorists across national
boundaries—military efforts against terror continue unabated,
just under a different moniker.
My goal has been modest: to begin a conversation about the
nature of America’s war-saturated legal culture and to begin to
tease apart the multiple ways that war-dependent arguments are
made during constitutional debate. Strong normative solutions
are beyond the scope of this essay, though one can imagine several
possible remedies: (1) more rigorous use of historical methods
when past wars are cited as precedent; (2) highly fact-specific
rulings when war justifications are made; (3) open consideration
of downstream doctrinal consequences to counteract the logic of
war instrumentalism; (4) more historical proof both to authorize
war legacy claims and to determine the scope of any asserted warinspired legal principles; (5) greater specificity in articulating the
scope of war legacy arguments and principles; and (6) a
moratorium on war metaphors in judicial rulings.
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Whether implementing these or other methods during
judicial decision making can help to discipline war
constitutionalism I will leave for another day, for doing the topic
justice requires a systematic accounting of methods and contexts,
and careful consideration of the tradeoffs of each possible
measure. In the meantime, appreciating the different forms that
war arguments take will hopefully serve as an important first step,
helping us to assert more control over a militarized culture instead
of allowing that culture to wreak havoc with our legal order.

